Related papers: Auditing for Core Stability in Participatory Budge…

The core is a quintessential solution concept for profit sharing in cooperative game theory. An imputation allocates the worth of the given game among its agents. The imputation lies in the core of the game if, for each sub-coalition, the…

We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects, by aggregating their proposals on a single division. Unfortunately, the straight-forward rule that…

We study the problem of fair $k$-committee selection under an egalitarian objective. Given $n$ agents partitioned into $m$ groups (\eg, demographic quotas), the goal is to aggregate their preferences to form a committee of size $k$ that…

We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compatibility between proportional representation and committee…

Multi-winner approval-based voting has received considerable attention recently. A voting rule in this setting takes as input ballots in which each agent approves a subset of the available alternatives and outputs a committee of…

In the context of single-winner ranked-choice elections between $m$ candidates, we explore the tradeoff between two competing goals in every democratic system: the majority principle (maximizing the social welfare) and the minority…

This paper studies how to aggregate prosumers (or large consumers) and their collective decisions in electricity markets, with a focus on fairness. Fairness is essential for prosumers to participate in aggregation schemes. Some prosumers…

We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this…

Many societal decision problems lie in high-dimensional continuous spaces not amenable to the voting techniques common for their discrete or single-dimensional counterparts. These problems are typically discretized before running an…

Participatory Budgeting (PB) offers a democratic process for communities to allocate public funds across various projects through voting. In practice, PB organizers face challenges in selecting aggregation rules either because they are not…

This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…

Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…

The fast spreading adoption of machine learning (ML) by companies across industries poses significant regulatory challenges. One such challenge is scalability: how can regulatory bodies efficiently audit these ML models, ensuring that they…

A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…

We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences into a single output allocation. Motivated by scenarios in…

Participatory budgeting is a popular method to engage residents in budgeting decisions by local governments. The Stanford Participatory Budgeting platform is an online platform that has been used to engage residents in more than 150…

We study the problem of auditing the fairness of a given classifier under partial feedback, where true labels are available only for positively classified individuals, (e.g., loan repayment outcomes are observed only for approved…

We study the problem of auditing classifiers with the notion of statistical subgroup fairness. Kearns et al. (2018) has shown that the problem of auditing combinatorial subgroups fairness is as hard as agnostic learning. Essentially all…

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex…

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a form of participatory democracy in which citizens select a set of projects to be implemented, subject to a budget constraint. The Method of Equal Shares (MES), introduced in [18], is a simple iterative…