Related papers: Ambiguous Cheap Talk
Pervasive personal communication technologies offer the potential for important social benefits for individual users, but also the potential for significant social difficulties and costs. In research on face-to-face social interaction,…
This paper investigates the formal pragmatics of ambiguous expressions by modeling ambiguity in a multi-agent system. Such a framework allows us to give a more refined notion of the kind of information that is conveyed by ambiguous…
Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante…
A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play…
Standard models of multi-agent modal logic do not capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and may be interpreted in different ways by different agents. We propose a framework that can model this, and consider different…
According to conventional wisdom, ambiguity accelerates optimal timing by decreasing the value of waiting in comparison with the unambiguous benchmark case. We study this mechanism in a multidimensional setting and show that in a…
I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority of the electorate in order to win an election. I…
While multi-agent debate has been proposed as a promising strategy for improving AI reasoning ability, we find that debate can sometimes be harmful rather than helpful. Prior work has primarily focused on debates within homogeneous groups…
For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are…
We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and…
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…
We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that…
This paper develops a theory of learning under ambiguity induced by the decision maker's beliefs about the collection of data correlated with the true state of the world. Within our framework, two classical results on Bayesian learning…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning offers a way to study how communication could emerge in communities of agents needing to solve specific problems. In this paper, we study the emergence of communication in the negotiation environment, a…
We study emergent communication in a multi-agent reinforcement learning setting, where the agents solve cooperative tasks and have access to a communication channel. The communication channel may consist of either discrete symbols or…
I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an…
This paper introduces a model of self-organization between communication and topology in social networks, with a feedback between different communication habits and the topology. To study this feedback, we let agents communicate to build a…
In this study, I present a theoretical social learning model to investigate how confirmation bias affects opinions when agents exchange information over a social network. Hence, besides exchanging opinions with friends, agents observe a…
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…
A sender communicates private information about a hidden state to a receiver who seeks to match his action to that state. The sender strives to appear informed at the receiver's expense. I characterize informative equilibria under a broad…