Related papers: Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe f…

In many machine learning applications, there are multiple decision-makers involved, both automated and human. The interaction between these agents often goes unaddressed in algorithmic development. In this work, we explore a simple version…

As a robot senses and selects actions, the world keeps changing. This inference delay creates a gap of tens to hundreds of milliseconds between the observed state and the state at execution. In this work, we take the natural generalization…

To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…

State-of-the-art results in typical classification tasks are mostly achieved by unexplainable machine learning methods, like deep neural networks, for instance. Contrarily, in this paper, we investigate the application of rule learning…

While utilization of digital agents to support crucial decision making is increasing, trust in suggestions made by these agents is hard to achieve. However, it is essential to profit from their application, resulting in a need for…

In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…

We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…

In a setting of many-to-one two-sided matching with non-transferable utilities, e.g., college admissions, we study conditions under which preferences of both sides are identified with data on one single market. Regardless of whether the…

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…

This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without…

We investigate the allocation of children to childcare facilities and propose solutions to overcome limitations in the current allocation mechanism. We introduce a natural preference domain and a priority structure that address these…

The standard two-sided and one-sided matching problems, and the closely related school choice problem, have been widely studied from an axiomatic viewpoint. A small number of algorithms dominate the literature. For two-sided matching, the…

In a typical school choice application, the students have strict preferences over the schools while the schools have coarse priorities over the students based on their distance and their enrolled siblings. The outcome of a centralized…

We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may…

Feature attribution methods help make machine learning-based inference explainable by determining how much one or several features have contributed to a model's output. A particularly popular attribution method is based on the Shapley value…

We study the distribution of envy in random matching markets under the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using tools from applied probability, we compute the expected number of proposing agents whom nobody envies and those who envy…

We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we investigate a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem where…

We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the strategyproofness of deferred acceptance (DA) can be recognized…

We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are…

Agents care not only about the outcomes of collective decisions but also about how decisions are made. In many cases, both the outcome and the procedure affect whether agents see a decision as legitimate, justifiable, or acceptable. We…