Related papers: Logic and Reduction Operation based Hardware Troja…

The outsourced manufacturing of integrated circuits has increased the risk of intellectual property theft. In response, logic locking techniques have been developed for protecting designs by adding programmable elements to the circuit.…

The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has moved most of the design, fabrication, and testing process from a single trusted entity to various untrusted third-party entities around the world. The risk of using…

In today's digital age, the ease of data collection, transfer, and storage continue to shape modern society and the ways we interact with our world. The advantages are numerous, but there is also an increased risk of information…

Not long ago, it was thought that only software applications and general purpose digital systems i.e. computers were prone to various types of attacks against their security. The underlying hardware, hardware implementations of these…

High-level synthesis (HLS) is the next emerging trend for designing complex customized architectures for applications such as Machine Learning, Video Processing. It provides a higher level of abstraction and freedom to hardware engineers to…

Design and manufacturing of integrated circuits predominantly use a globally distributed semiconductor supply chain involving diverse entities. The modern semiconductor supply chain has been designed to boost production efficiency, but is…

In this paper, we introduce a Learning Assisted Side Channel delay Analysis (LASCA) methodology for Hardware Trojan detection. Our proposed solution, unlike the prior art, does not require a Golden IC. Instead, it trains a Neural Network to…

Speculative execution attacks leverage the speculative and out-of-order execution features in modern computer processors to access secret data or execute code that should not be executed. Secret information can then be leaked through a…

Recent studies have shown that neural networks are vulnerable to Trojan attacks, where a network is trained to respond to specially crafted trigger patterns in the inputs in specific and potentially malicious ways. This paper proposes MISA,…

We propose CLEANN, the first end-to-end framework that enables online mitigation of Trojans for embedded Deep Neural Network (DNN) applications. A Trojan attack works by injecting a backdoor in the DNN while training; during inference, the…

To reduce the cost of ICs and to meet the market's demand, a considerable portion of manufacturing supply chain, including silicon fabrication, packaging and testing may be pushed offshore. Utilizing a global IC manufacturing supply chain,…

The emergence of distributed manufacturing ecosystems for electronic hardware involving untrusted parties has given rise to diverse trust issues. In particular, IP piracy, overproduction, and hardware Trojan attacks pose significant threats…

Trojan attack on deep neural networks, also known as backdoor attack, is a typical threat to artificial intelligence. A trojaned neural network behaves normally with clean inputs. However, if the input contains a particular trigger, the…

Machine learning models in the wild have been shown to be vulnerable to Trojan attacks during training. Although many detection mechanisms have been proposed, strong adaptive attackers have been shown to be effective against them. In this…

Hardware Trojans can inflict harm on wireless networks by exploiting the link margins inherent in communication systems. We investigate a setting in which, alongside a legitimate communication link, a hardware Trojan embedded in the…

Recent advances in Trajectory Optimization (TO) models have achieved remarkable success in offline reinforcement learning. However, their vulnerabilities against backdoor attacks are poorly understood. We find that existing backdoor attacks…

Split manufacturing is a promising technique to defend against fab-based malicious activities such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of hardware Trojans. However, a network flow-based proximity attack, proposed by Wang et al.…

Hardware Trojans (HTs) remain a critical threat because learning-based detectors often overfit to narrow trigger/payload patterns and small, stylized benchmarks. We introduce TrojanGYM, an agentic, LLM-driven framework that automatically…

Machine learning models are routinely deployed on a wide range of computing hardware. Although such hardware is typically expected to produce identical results, differences in its design can lead to small numerical variations during…

Side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic devices. They use only quantities observable from outside, such as the duration and the power consumption. Attacks against synchronous devices using electric observations are…