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We revisit a model proposed by Freedman etal in \cite{freedman} which describes the dynamics of a population diffusing in a patchy environment. From their work it is known that positive steady states exist for this model, but not whether…
In this communication, some economic models given by functional mappings are addressed. These are models for random markets where agents trade by pairs and exchange their money in a random and conservative way. They display the exponential…
For a class of stochastic dynamical models of exchange economies that we call ``fully connected Cobb-Douglas'', the paper proves convergence of the probability distribution to an equilibrium, in total variation metric as time goes to…
We present a class of one-to-one matching models with perfectly transferable utility. We discuss identification and inference in these separable models, and we show how their comparative statics are readily analyzed.
We study a spatially homogeneous model of a market where several agents or companies compete for a wealth resource. In analogy with ecological systems the simplest case of such models shows a kind of "competitive exclusion" principle.…
There are several aspects of data markets that distinguish them from a typical commodity market: asymmetric information, the non-rivalrous nature of data, and informational externalities. Formally, this gives rise to a new class of games…
We propose a novel kinetic exchange model differing from previous ones in two main aspects. First, the basic dynamics is modified in order to represent economies where immediate wealth exchanges are carried out, instead of reshufflings or…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
We consider piecewise linear discrete time macroeconomic models, which possess a continuum of equilibrium states. These systems are obtained by replacing rational inflation expectations with a boundedly rational, and genuinely sticky,…
The motivation of this note is to show how singular values affect local uniqueness. More precisely, Theorem 3.1 shows how to construct a neighborhood (a ball) of a regular equilibrium whose diameter represents an estimate of local…
Since the seminal work by Meirowitz, there has been growing attention on the existence and uniqueness of continuous Bayesian Nash equilibria. In the existing literature, existence is typically established using Schauder's fixed-point…
Competitive equilibrium (CE) is a fundamental concept in market economics. Its efficiency and fairness properties make it particularly appealing as a rule for fair allocation of resources among agents with possibly different entitlements.…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
We develop a market model in which products generate state-dependent potential hidden charges. Firms differ in their ability to realize this potential. Unlike firms, consumers do not observe the state. They try to infer hidden charges from…
In this paper, we propose an equilibrium pricing model in a dynamic multi-period stochastic framework with uncertain income streams. In an incomplete market, there exist two traded risky assets (e.g. stock/commodity and weather derivative)…
Uniqueness of effective interaction defined in an extension of the Kohn-Sham theory is proved, if the model with a non-degenerate ground state exists and to reproduce a correlation function as well as the single-particle density of an…
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…
We study the connection between risk aversion, number of consumers and uniqueness of equilibrium. We consider an economy with two goods and $c$ impatience types, where each type has additive separable preferences with HARA Bernoulli utility…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…