Related papers: On Poisoned Wardrop Equilibrium in Congestion Game…
We study the emergence of chaotic behavior of Follow-the-Regularized Leader (FoReL) dynamics in games. We focus on the effects of increasing the population size or the scale of costs in congestion games, and generalize recent results on…
This paper presents an optimization framework to model Formula 1 racing dynamics, where multiple cars interact physically and strategically. Aerodynamic wake effects, trajectory optimization, and energy management are integrated by means of…
As pairwise ranking becomes broadly employed for elections, sports competitions, recommendations, and so on, attackers have strong motivation and incentives to manipulate the ranking list. They could inject malicious comparisons into the…
Data is the new oil; this refrain is repeated extensively in the age of internet tracking, machine learning, and data analytics. As data collection becomes more personal and pervasive, however, public pressure is mounting for privacy…
This work explores the relationship between the set of Wardrop equilibria~(WE) of a routing game, the total demand of that game, and the occurrence of Braess's paradox~(BP). The BP formalizes the counter-intuitive fact that for some…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded in a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is to choose a strategy that maximizes her utility given the…
We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess' paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the addition…
Recent research in the social sciences has identified situations in which small changes in the way that information is provided to consumers can have large aggregate effects on behavior. This has been promoted in popular media in areas of…
We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the…
In this paper we consider the application of Stackelberg game theory to model discretionary lane-changing in lightly congested highway setting. The fundamental intent of this model, which is parameterized to capture driver disposition…
In recent work by Bramoull\'{e} and Kranton, a model for the provision of public goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game and properties of the network were established. This model was further…
In this paper we propose a LWR-like model for traffic flow on networks which allows one to track several groups of drivers, each of them being characterized only by their destination in the network. The path actually followed to reach the…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
Recent studies on transportation networks have shown that real-time route guidance can inadvertently induce congestion or oscillatory traffic patterns. Nevertheless, such technologies also offer a promising opportunity to manage traffic…
The evolution of existing transportation systems,mainly driven by urbanization and increased availability of mobility options, such as private, profit-maximizing ride-hailing companies, calls for tools to reason about their design and…
Using mobile robots for autonomous patrolling of environments to prevent intrusions is a topic of increasing practical relevance. One of the most challenging scientific issues is the problem of finding effective patrolling strategies that,…
We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph,…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…