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We consider availability data poisoning attacks, where an adversary aims to degrade the overall test accuracy of a machine learning model by crafting small perturbations to its training data. Existing poisoning strategies can achieve the…
This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…
We study the role of costly information in non-cooperative two-player games when an extrinsic third party information broker is introduced asymmetrically, allowing one player to obtain information about the other player's action. This…
We investigate a privacy-signaling game problem in which a sender with privacy concerns observes a pair of correlated random vectors which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The sender aims to hide one of these random vectors and convey the…
We consider a multi-user network where a network manager and selfish users interact. The network manager monitors the behavior of users and intervenes in the interaction among users if necessary, while users make decisions independently to…
We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…
Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern…
We study a security threat to reinforcement learning where an attacker poisons the learning environment to force the agent into executing a target policy chosen by the attacker. As a victim, we consider RL agents whose objective is to find…
When traffic is routed through a network that is susceptible to congestion, the self-interested decisions made by individual users do not, in general, produce the optimal flow. This discrepancy is quantified by the so-called "price of…
The introduction of advanced communication infrastructure into the power grid raises a plethora of new opportunities to tackle climate change. This paper is concerned with the security of energy management systems which are expected to be…
Westudy how a planner can design dynamic interventions to overcome status-quo inertia in living temporal games, where strategic agents control their state (active, sleep, partially dead) on a temporal network. Building on the…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
Recent advancements in vehicle autonomy have drawn interest in understanding the impact of autonomous vehicles on traffic systems. In this paper, we study a traffic assignment problem in a mixed-autonomy setting where both human-driven and…
Leveraging recent advances in wireless communication, IoT, and AI, intelligent transportation systems (ITS) played an important role in reducing traffic congestion and enhancing user experience. Within ITS, navigational recommendation…
We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…
In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…
In this paper we propose a dynamic Stackelberg game-theoretic model for urban freight transportation planning which is able to characterize the interaction between freight and personal transportation in an urban area. The problem is…
Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary…