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We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
We consider the behavior of the price of anarchy and equilibrium flows in nonatomic multi-commodity routing games as a function of the traffic demand. We analyze their smoothness with a special attention to specific values of the demand at…
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…
Disinformation continues to attract attention due to its increasing threat to society. Nevertheless, a disinformation-based attack on critical infrastructure has never been studied to date. Here, we consider traffic networks and focus on…
We propose InfoChess, a symmetric adversarial game that elevates competitive information acquisition to the primary objective. There is no piece capture, removing material incentives that would otherwise confound the role of information.…
Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…
This study investigates an adaptive pricing scheme aimed at achieving an efficient state in a traffic congestion game characterized by a diverse population of road users. While the planner possesses knowledge of players' preferences, their…
We study the problem of generating data poisoning attacks against Knowledge Graph Embedding (KGE) models for the task of link prediction in knowledge graphs. To poison KGE models, we propose to exploit their inductive abilities which are…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their…
Solving the road congestion problem is one of the most pressing issues in moderncities since it causes time wasting, pollution, higher industrial costs and huge roadmaintenance costs. Advances in ITS technologies and the advent of…
We consider the following two-player game: using observational data, the leader chooses a prediction function for a response variable $Y$ from given covariates. The follower then reacts with an intervention on some covariates in the…
We develop an analytical Stackelberg game framework for optimal resource allocation in a sequential attacker--defender setting with a finite set of assets and probabilistic attacks. The defender commits to a mixed protection strategy, after…
In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous traffic network with multiple users classes which differ considerably in their path selection objective. In particular, we consider two classes of users: ones who seek to minimize social cost…
Routing games are amongst the most well studied domains of game theory. How relevant are these pen-and-paper calculations to understanding the reality of everyday traffic routing? We focus on a semantically rich dataset that captures…
We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…
In congestion games, users make myopic routing decisions to jam each other, and the social planner with the full information designs mechanisms on information or payment side to regulate. However, it is difficult to obtain time-varying…
This paper presents the equilibrium analysis of a game composed of heterogeneous electric vehicles (EVs) and a power distribution system operator (DSO) as the players, and charging station operators (CSOs) and a transportation network…
In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…
We propose a minority route choice game to investigate the effect of the network structure on traffic network performance under the assumption of drivers' bounded rationality. We investigate ring-and-hub topologies to capture the nature of…