Related papers: Last-iterate Convergence to Trembling-hand Perfect…

Imperfect-recall abstraction has emerged as the leading paradigm for practical large-scale equilibrium computation in incomplete-information games. However, imperfect-recall abstractions are poorly understood, and only weak…

We study the application of iterative first-order methods to the problem of computing equilibria of large-scale two-player extensive-form games. First-order methods must typically be instantiated with a regularizer that serves as a…

We study the problem of finding optimal correlated equilibria of various sorts in extensive-form games: normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium (NFCCE), extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), and extensive-form correlated…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

We propose a new sequential Efficient Pseudo-Likelihood (k-EPL) estimator for dynamic discrete choice games of incomplete information. k-EPL considers the joint behavior of multiple players simultaneously, as opposed to individual responses…

We study the deterministic and randomized query complexity of finding approximate equilibria in bimatrix games. We show that the deterministic query complexity of finding an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium when $\epsilon < \frac{1}{2}$ is…

In recent years, empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) has emerged as a powerful tool for analyzing games in which an exact specification of the utilities is unavailable. Instead, EGTA assumes access to an oracle, i.e., a simulator,…

In this paper, we introduce the first algorithmic framework for Blackwell approachability on the sequence-form polytope, the class of convex polytopes capturing the strategies of players in extensive-form games (EFGs). This leads to a new…

Computational tractability and social welfare (aka. efficiency) of equilibria are two fundamental but in general orthogonal considerations in algorithmic game theory. Nevertheless, we show that when (approximate) full efficiency can be…

We introduce Cut-and-Play, a practically-efficient algorithm for computing Nash equilibria in simultaneous non-cooperative games where players decide via nonconvex and possibly unbounded optimization problems with separable payoff…

Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…

Modern random access mechanisms combine packet repetitions with multi-user detection mechanisms at the receiver to maximize the throughput and reliability in massive Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios. However, optimizing the access policy,…

Wide machine learning tasks can be formulated as non-convex multi-player games, where Nash equilibrium (NE) is an acceptable solution to all players, since no one can benefit from changing its strategy unilaterally. Attributed to the…

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…

Iterated regret minimization has been introduced recently by J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass in classical strategic games. For many games of interest, this new solution concept provides solutions that are judged more reasonable than solutions…

Imperfect recall games represent dynamic interactions where players forget previously known information, such as a history of played actions. The importance of imperfect recall games stems from allowing a concise representation of…

We consider the problem of finding Nash equilibrium for two-player turn-based zero-sum games. Inspired by the AlphaGo Zero (AGZ) algorithm, we develop a Reinforcement Learning based approach. Specifically, we propose…

This article discusses two contributions to decision-making in complex partially observable stochastic games. First, we apply two state-of-the-art search techniques that use Monte-Carlo sampling to the task of approximating a…

We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…