Related papers: Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Appr…

We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed…

Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility. Yet many empirical evidence suggests that human decisions may…

In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…

Political and advertising campaigns increasingly exploit social networks to spread information and persuade people. This paper studies a persuasion model to examine whether such a strategy is better than simply sending public signals.…

We study a persuasion problem in which a sender designs an information structure to induce a non-Bayesian receiver to take a particular action. The receiver, who is privately informed about his preferences, is a wishful thinker: he is…

We consider a Bayesian persuasion or information design problem where the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model by considering multi-phase trials with different…

We study a long-run persuasion problem where a long-lived Sender repeatedly interacts with a sequence of short-lived Receivers who may adopt a misspecified model for belief updating. The Sender commits to a stationary information structure,…

We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…

Classical Bayesian persuasion assumes that senders fully understand how receivers form beliefs and make decisions--an assumption that rarely holds when receivers possess private information or exhibit non-Bayesian behavior. In this paper,…

We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has…

Most work in mechanism design assumes that buyers are risk neutral; some considers risk aversion arising due to a non-linear utility for money. Yet behavioral studies have established that real agents exhibit risk attitudes which cannot be…

A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what…

The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the…

Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information revelation --- often described as a signaling scheme --- in order to yield the most desirable equilibrium outcome. Recently, there has been a large…

In many real-world scenarios, experts must convey complex information with limited message capacity. This paper explores how the availability of messages influences an expert's persuasive ability. We develop a geometric representation of…

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender, who observes a state, commits to a randomized signaling scheme that guides a self-interested receiver's actions. Classical models assume the receiver knows the commitment. We, instead, study the…

We study Bayesian persuasion when the receiver evaluates actions by reward-side Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) rather than expected utility. CVaR preferences break the standard action-based direct-recommendation reduction: merging signals…

When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the…

This paper develops a data-driven approach to Bayesian persuasion. The receiver is privately informed about the prior distribution of the state of the world, the sender knows the receiver's preferences but does not know the distribution of…

How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…