Related papers: A Coupling Approach to Analyzing Games with Dynami…
We present a novel algorithm for game-theoretic trajectory planning, tailored for settings in which agents can only observe one another in specific regions of the state space. Such problems arise naturally in the context of multi-robot…
Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong reasoning abilities across mathematical, strategic, and linguistic tasks, yet little is known about how well they reason in dynamic, real-time, multi-agent scenarios, such as collaborative…
A systematic framework for analyzing dynamical attributes of games has not been well-studied except for the special class of potential or near-potential games. In particular, the existing results have shortcomings in determining the…
Starting with a group of reinforcement-learning agents we derive coupled replicator equations that describe the dynamics of collective learning in multiagent systems. We show that, although agents model their environment in a…
Introducing environmental feedback into evolutionary game theory has led to the development of eco-evolutionary games, which have gained popularity due to their ability to capture the intricate interplay between the environment and…
We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-timescale learning dynamics to answer this question in both…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
Stochastic games have become a prevalent framework for studying long-term multi-agent interactions, especially in the context of multi-agent reinforcement learning. In this work, we comprehensively investigate the concept of constant-memory…
In this paper, we study multi-agent network games subject to affine time-varying coupling constraints and a time-varying communication network. We focus on the class of games adopting proximal dynamics and study their convergence to a…
Understanding the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning is a fundamental problem of great practical relevance in many applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning. While it is known that learning dynamics converge to…
Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…
Recently, the eco-evolutionary game theory which describes the coupled dynamics of strategies and environment have attracted great attention. At the same time, most of the current work is focused on the classic two-player two-strategy game.…
The standard risk minimization paradigm of machine learning is brittle when operating in environments whose test distributions are different from the training distribution due to spurious correlations. Training on data from many…
In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…
Motivated by applications in job scheduling, queuing networks, and load balancing in cyber-physical systems, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic framework to balance the load among servers in static and dynamic settings. In these…
The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…
We analyse the typical structure of games in terms of the connectivity properties of their best-response graphs. Our central result shows that, among games that are `generic' (without indifferences) and that have a pure Nash equilibrium,…
The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…