Related papers: Information Design in Cheap Talk
This paper compares statistical experiments in discounted problems, ranging from the simplest ones where the state is fixed and the flow of information exogenous to more complex ones, where the decision-maker controls the flow of…
Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…
In the Bayesian persuasion model, a sender can convince a receiver to choose an alternative action to the one originally preferred by the receiver. A crucial assumption in this model is the sender's commitment to a predetermined information…
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…
We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…
In this paper, we study platforms where resources and jobs are spatially distributed, and resources have the flexibility to strategically move to different locations for better payoffs. The price of the service at each location depends on…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen alternative and the unknown underlying state. Agents learn about the…
We introduce the concept of knowledge states; many well-known algorithms can be viewed as knowledge state algorithms. The knowledge state approach can be used to to construct competitive randomized online algorithms and study the tradeoff…
A sender seeks to persuade a receiver by presenting evidence obtained through a sequence of private experiments. The sender has complete flexibility in his choice of experiments, contingent on the private experimentation history. The sender…
Private signals model noisy information about an unknown state. Although these signals are called "private," they may still carry information about each other. Our paper introduces the concept of private private signals, which contain…
We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…
Natural language is an intuitive and expressive way to communicate reward information to autonomous agents. It encompasses everything from concrete instructions to abstract descriptions of the world. Despite this, natural language is often…
We address Bayesian persuasion between a sender and a receiver with state-dependent quadratic cost measures for general classes of distributions. The receiver seeks to make mean-square-error estimate of a state based on a signal sent by the…
A principal designs an algorithm that generates a publicly observable prediction of a binary state. She must decide whether to act directly based on the prediction or to delegate the decision to an agent with private information but…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints…
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…
We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An informed advisor decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term…
We study the problem of designing mechanisms for \emph{information acquisition} scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed \emph{receiver} and a set of informed \emph{senders}. In our model the senders…