Related papers: Cooperation in regular lattices
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower…
Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During the game, cooperators punish defectors with…
Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…
A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow only two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally. The players updated in a random sequence have a…
We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…
We study the effects of conformity, the tendency of humans to imitate locally common behaviors, in the evolution of cooperation when individuals occupy the vertices of a graph and engage in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma or the Snowdrift…
We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected…
Cancer cells obtain mutations which rely on the production of diffusible growth factors to confer a fitness benefit. These mutations can be considered cooperative, and studied as public goods games within the framework of evolutionary game…
The public goods game is a model of a society investing some assets and regaining a profit, although can also model biological populations. In the classic public goods game only two strategies compete: either cooperate or defect; a third…
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner's Dilemma game with two types ($A$ and $B$) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy…
Punishment is a common tactic to sustain cooperation and has been extensively studied for a long time. While most of previous game-theoretic work adopt the imitation learning where players imitate the strategies who are better off, the…
Population structure induced by both spatial embedding and more general networks of interaction, such as model social networks, have been shown to have a fundamental effect on the dynamics and outcome of evolutionary games. These effects…
The evolutionary mechanisms of cooperative behavior represent a fundamental topic in complex systems and evolutionary dynamics. Real-world collective interactions, particularly in multi-agent systems, are often characterized by…
Cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies represents a most intriguing puzzle to scientists in various disciplines. Here we present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full…
Biological and social scientists have long been interested in understanding how to reconcile individual and collective interests in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Many effective strategies have been proposed, and they are often categorized…
The Prisoner's Dilemma Process on a graph $G$ is an iterative process where each vertex, with a fixed strategy (cooperate or defect), plays the game with each of its neighbours. At the end of a round each vertex may change its strategy to…
Social hierarchy is important that can not be ignored in human socioeconomic activities and in the animal world. Here we incorporate this factor into the evolutionary game to see what impact it could have on the cooperation outcome. The…
In times of plenty expectations rise, just as in times of crisis they fall. This can be mathematically described as a Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy with dynamic aspiration levels, where individuals aspire to be as wealthy as their average…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
We revisit two evolutionary game theory models, namely the Prisoner and the Snowdrift dilemmas, on top of small-world networks. These dynamics on networked populations (individuals occupying nodes of a graph) are mainly concerning on the…