Related papers: Weighted Average-convexity and Cooperative Games
Measuring contributions is a classical problem in cooperative game theory where the Shapley value is the most well-known solution concept. In this paper, we establish the convergence property of the Shapley value in parametric Bayesian…
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…
The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be "fairly" divided among players. While it has a wide range of real…
With the advance of complex large-scale networks, it is becoming increasingly important to understand how selfish and spatially distributed individuals will share network resources without centralized coordinations. In this paper, we…
We introduce a new class of totally balanced cooperative TU games, namely p -additive games. It is inspired by the class of inventory games that arises from inventory situations with temporary discounts (Toledo, 2002) and contains the class…
We study a class of probabilistic cooperative games which can be treated as an extension of the classical cooperative games with transferable utilities. The coalitions have an exogenous probability of being realized. This probability…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
In this paper we first define a new kind of potential games, called coset weighted potential game, which is a generalized form of weighted potential game. Using semi-tensor product of matrices, an algebraic method is provided to verify…
Hierarchical simple games - both disjunctive and conjunctive - are natural generalizations of simple majority games. They take their origin in the theory of secret sharing. Another important generalization of simple majority games with…
In studies of social dynamics, cohesion refers to a group's tendency to stay in unity, which -- as argued in sociometry -- arises from the network topology of interpersonal ties between members of the group. We follow this idea and propose…
In this note we give sufficient conditions for the convergence of the iterative algorithm called weighted-average consensus in directed graphs. We study the discrete-time form of this algorithm. We use standard techniques from matrix theory…
We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified ``propensity to disrupt'' the negotiation process of the…
The attribution problem, that is the problem of attributing a model's prediction to its base features, is well-studied. We extend the notion of attribution to also apply to feature interactions. The Shapley value is a commonly used method…
We investigate the distribution of the well-studied Shapley--Shubik values in weighted voting games where the agents are stochastically determined. The Shapley--Shubik value measures the voting power of an agent, in typical collective…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
Artificial Neural Networks have shown impressive success in very different application cases. Choosing a proper network architecture is a critical decision for a network's success, usually done in a manual manner. As a straightforward…
Weighted voting games are a family of cooperative games, typically used to model voting situations where a number of agents (players) vote against or for a proposal. In such games, a proposal is accepted if an appropriately weighted sum of…
This study proposes a novel solution concept--the w-value--for cooperative games with public externalities. The w-value is axiomatically founded on three principles: Pareto Optimality (PO), Market Equilibrium (ME), and Fiscal Balance (FB),…
The Shapley value is one of the most widely used measures of feature importance partly as it measures a feature's average effect on a model's prediction. We introduce joint Shapley values, which directly extend Shapley's axioms and…