Related papers: Diegetic Representation of Feedback in Open Games
Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-player games. Our method is a natural generalization of gradient descent to the two-player setting where the update is given by the Nash…
This paper proposes a novel approach for locally stable convergence to Nash equilibrium in duopoly noncooperative games based on a distributed event-triggered control scheme. The proposed approach employs extremum seeking, with sinusoidal…
This paper studies the problem of Nash equilibrium approximation in large-scale heterogeneous mean-field games under communication and computation constraints. A deterministic mean-field game is considered in which the non-linear utility…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
An open problem in linear quadratic (LQ) games has been characterizing the Nash equilibria. This problem has renewed relevance given the surge of work on understanding the convergence of learning algorithms in dynamic games. This paper…
This paper presents a concurrent learning-based actor-critic-identifier architecture to obtain an approximate feedback-Nash equilibrium solution to an infinite horizon N-player nonzero-sum differential game online, without requiring…
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…
We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are…
Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we…
This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…
Two fundamental problems in computational game theory are computing a Nash equilibrium and learning to exploit opponents given observations of their play (opponent exploitation). The latter is perhaps even more important than the former:…
We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…
Multiagent learning settings are inherently more difficult than single-agent learning because each agent interacts with other simultaneously learning agents in a shared environment. An effective approach in multiagent reinforcement learning…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for identification of…
Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…