Related papers: A social structure description of epidemics propag…
We investigate an SIR model of epidemic propagation on networks in the context of mean-field games. In a real epidemic, individuals adjust their behavior depending on the epidemic level and the impact it might have on them in the future.…
The design of coherent and efficient policies to address infectious diseases and their consequences requires to model not only epidemics dynamics, but also individual behaviors, as the latter has a strong influence on the former. In our…
In this paper, we develop a mean-field game model for SEIR epidemics on heterogeneous contact networks, where individuals choose state-dependent contact effort to balance infection losses against the social and economic costs of isolation.…
We introduce a new type of Mean Field Game epidemiological models, in which subpopulations have different behavioral patterns: some are viewed as "highly rational" (choosing Nash-equilibrium long-term strategies) while others follow…
We consider the control of the COVID-19 pandemic through a standard SIR compartmental model. This control is induced by the aggregation of individuals' decisions to limit their social interactions: when the epidemic is ongoing, an…
When an epidemic spreads in a population, individuals may adaptively change the structure of their social contact network to reduce risk of infection. Here we study the spread of an epidemic on an adaptive network with community structure.…
This paper considers a stochastic SIR (susceptible$\to$infective$\to$removed) epidemic model in which individuals may make infectious contacts in two ways, both within `households' (which for ease of exposition are assumed to have equal…
The paper describes and compares three approaches to modeling an epidemic spread. The first approach is a well-known system of SIR ordinary differential equations. The second is a mean-field model, in which an isolation strategy for each…
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model describing voluntary social distancing during the spread of an epidemic. The payoffs of the agents depend on the social distancing they practice and on the probability of getting infected. We…
Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID--19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a…
A network epidemic model is studied. The underlying social network has two different types of group structures, households and workplaces, such that each individual belongs to exactly one household and one workplace. The random network is…
The current COVID-19 pandemic has proven that proper control and prevention of infectious disease require creating and enforcing the appropriate public policies. One critical policy imposed by the policymakers is encouraging the population…
We study a multi-type SIR epidemic process among a heterogeneous population that interacts through a network. When we base social contact on a random graph with given vertex degrees, we give limit theorems on the fraction of infected…
In this paper we consider non-atomic games in populations that are provided with a choice of preventive policies to act against a contagion spreading amongst interacting populations, be it biological organisms or connected computing…
This paper is concerned with developing mean-field game models for the evolution of epidemics. Specifically, an agent's decision -- to be socially active in the midst of an epidemic -- is modeled as a mean-field game with health-related…
In this manuscript we present several possible ways of modeling human capital accumulation during the spread of a disease following an agent based approach, where agents behave maximizing their intertemporal utility. We assume that the…
Individual contributions to the spread of an epidemic vary widely due to an individual's location in a social network and their intrinsic ability to spread or contract diseases. While the effect of heterogeneous population structure and…
In the simple mean-field SIS and SIR epidemic models, infection is transmitted from infectious to susceptible members of a finite population by independent $p-$coin tosses. Spatial variants of these models are proposed, in which finite…
This paper develops a Nash-equilibrium extension of the classic SIR model of infectious-disease epidemiology ("Nash SIR"), endogenizing people's decisions whether to engage in economic activity during a viral epidemic and allowing for…
Motivated by models of epidemic control in large populations, we consider a Stackelberg mean field game model between a principal and a mean field of agents evolving on a finite state space. The agents play a non-cooperative game in which…