Related papers: Understanding RowHammer Under Reduced Wordline Vol…

RowHammer is a vulnerability inside DRAM chips where an attacker repeatedly accesses a DRAM row to flip bits in the nearby rows without directly accessing them. Several studies have found that flipping bits in the address part inside a page…

The demand for accurate information about the internal structure and characteristics of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) has been on the rise. Recent studies have explored the structure and characteristics of DRAM to improve processing…

DRAM cells are susceptible to Data-Disturbance Errors (DDE), which can be exploited by an attacker to compromise system security. Rowhammer is a well-known DDE vulnerability that occurs when a row is repeatedly activated. Rowhammer can be…

In this paper, we investigate the advanced circuit features such as wordline- (WL) underdrive (prevents retention failure) and overdrive (assists write) employed in the peripherals of Dynamic RAM (DRAM) memories from a security perspective.…

Emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies offer unique advantages in energy efficiency, latency, and features such as computing-in-memory. Consequently, emerging NVM technologies are considered an ideal substrate for computation and…

Cloud providers are concerned that Rowhammer poses a potentially critical threat to their servers, yet today they lack a systematic way to test whether the DRAM used in their servers is vulnerable to Rowhammer attacks. This paper presents…

After a plethora of high-profile RowHammer attacks, CPU and DRAM vendors scrambled to deliver what was meant to be the definitive hardware solution against the RowHammer problem: Target Row Refresh (TRR). A common belief among practitioners…

With lowering thresholds, transparently defending against Rowhammer within DRAM is challenging due to the lack of time to perform mitigation. Commercially deployed in-DRAM defenses like TRR that steal time from normal refreshes~(REF) to…

Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) is pervasive in computer systems. Cell vulnerabilities caused by unintended phenomena (forced retention failure, latency alteration, rowhammer and rowpress) lead to unintended bit flips in memory. These…

The Rowhammer vulnerability continues to get worse, with the Rowhammer Threshold (TRH) reducing from 139K activations to 4.8K activations over the last decade. Typical Rowhammer mitigations rely on tracking aggressor rows. The number of…

The RowHammer vulnerability in DRAM is a critical threat to system security. To protect against RowHammer, vendors commit to security-through-obscurity: modern DRAM chips rely on undocumented, proprietary, on-die mitigations, commonly known…

Non-volatile memory (NVM) is a class of promising scalable memory technologies that can potentially offer higher capacity than DRAM at the same cost point. Unfortunately, the access latency and energy of NVM is often higher than those of…

Modern architecture research relies on simulators to evaluate system security, yet analyzing emerging hardware vulnerabilities like RowHammer requires full-system visibility. As RowHammer vulnerabilities worsen with continuous technology…

Security of machine learning is increasingly becoming a major concern due to the ubiquitous deployment of deep learning in many security-sensitive domains. Many prior studies have shown external attacks such as adversarial examples that…

The purpose of this document is to study the security properties of the Silver Bullet algorithm against worst-case RowHammer attacks. We mathematically demonstrate that Silver Bullet, when properly configured and implemented in a DRAM chip,…

The demand for precise information on DRAM microarchitectures and error characteristics has surged, driven by the need to explore processing in memory, enhance reliability, and mitigate security vulnerability. Nonetheless, DRAM…

Increased process variability and reliability issues present a major challenge for future SRAM trends. Non-intrusive and accurate SRAM stability measurement is crucial for estimating yield in large SRAM arrays. Conventional SRAM variability…

A fundamental assumption in software security is that memory contents do not change unless there is a legitimate deliberate modification. Classical fault attacks show that this assumption does not hold if the attacker has physical access.…

The energy consumption of DRAM is a critical concern in modern computing systems. Improvements in manufacturing process technology have allowed DRAM vendors to lower the DRAM supply voltage conservatively, which reduces some of the DRAM…

A fundamental assumption in software security is that a memory location can only be modified by processes that may write to this memory location. However, a recent study has shown that parasitic effects in DRAM can change the content of a…