Related papers: Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Gener…

Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…

In modern advertising platforms, learning algorithms are deployed by budget-constrained bidders to maximize their accumulated value. These algorithms often offer classical utility guarantees like no-regret, i.e., the agent's utility is at…

The notion of \emph{policy regret} in online learning is a well defined? performance measure for the common scenario of adaptive adversaries, which more traditional quantities such as external regret do not take into account. We revisit the…

We study Online Convex Optimization (OCO) with adversarial constraints, where an online algorithm must make sequential decisions to minimize both convex loss functions and cumulative constraint violations. We focus on a setting where the…

Non-stationary online learning has drawn much attention in recent years. In particular, dynamic regret and adaptive regret are proposed as two principled performance measures for online convex optimization in non-stationary environments. To…

No-regret learning has been widely used to compute a Nash equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. However, there is still a lack of regret analysis for network stochastic zero-sum games, where players competing in two subnetworks only…

This paper investigates online composite optimization in dynamic environments, where each objective or loss function contains a time-varying nondifferentiable regularizer. To resolve it, an online proximal gradient algorithm is studied for…

We study algorithms for online linear optimization in Hilbert spaces, focusing on the case where the player is unconstrained. We develop a novel characterization of a large class of minimax algorithms, recovering, and even improving,…

This paper considers online convex optimization over a complicated constraint set, which typically consists of multiple functional constraints and a set constraint. The conventional online projection algorithm (Zinkevich, 2003) can be…

We show for the first time, to our knowledge, that it is possible to reconcile in online learning in zero-sum games two seemingly contradictory objectives: vanishing time-average regret and non-vanishing step sizes. This phenomenon, that we…

Adversarial training, a special case of multi-objective optimization, is an increasingly prevalent machine learning technique: some of its most notable applications include GAN-based generative modeling and self-play techniques in…

In this paper, we investigate the existence of online learning algorithms with bandit feedback that simultaneously guarantee $O(1)$ regret compared to a given comparator strategy, and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret compared to any fixed…

We study an online forecasting setting in which, over $T$ rounds, $N$ strategic experts each report a forecast to a mechanism, the mechanism selects one forecast, and then the outcome is revealed. In any given round, each expert has a…

We study online learning problems in which the learner has extra knowledge about the adversary's behaviour, i.e., in game-theoretic settings where opponents typically follow some no-external regret learning algorithms. Under this…

We study the problem of characterizing optimal learning algorithms for playing repeated games against an adversary with unknown payoffs. In this problem, the first player (called the learner) commits to a learning algorithm against a second…

This paper studies the optimistic variant of Fictitious Play for learning in two-player zero-sum games. While it is known that Optimistic FTRL -- a regularized algorithm with a bounded stepsize parameter -- obtains constant regret in this…

We consider an agent interacting with an environment in a single stream of actions, observations, and rewards, with no reset. This process is not assumed to be a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Rather, the agent has several representations…

We study online learning in two-player uninformed Markov games, where the opponent's actions and policies are unobserved. In this setting, Tian et al. (2021) show that achieving no-external-regret is impossible without incurring an…

Regret minimization is a general approach to online optimization which plays a crucial role in many algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. The literature mainly focuses on solving individual games in…

Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium by allowing a central coordinator to guide players' actions through shared recommendations, similar to how routing apps guide drivers. We investigate how a coordinator can learn a…