Related papers: A unified stochastic approximation framework for l…

We study the performance of the gradient play algorithm for stochastic games (SGs), where each agent tries to maximize its own total discounted reward by making decisions independently based on current state information which is shared…

We study model-based and model-free policy optimization in a class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games called linear quadratic (LQ) deep structured games. In such games, players interact with each other through a set of weighted…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

We introduce a new class of population games that we call monotropic; these are games characterized by the presence of a unique globally neutrally stable Nash equilibrium. Monotropic games generalize strictly concave potential games and…

We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…

This paper considers convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their own cost functions using locally available information. A common assumption in the study of such games is that the agents are symmetric, meaning that…

Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…

Model-free learning for multi-agent stochastic games is an active area of research. Existing reinforcement learning algorithms, however, are often restricted to zero-sum games, and are applicable only in small state-action spaces or other…

This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in Cournot games with continuous actions. Cournot games are the essential model for many socio-economic systems, where players compete by strategically setting their output quantity.…

Individuals, or organizations, cooperate with or compete against one another in a wide range of practical situations. Such strategic interactions are often modeled as games played on networks, where an individual's payoff depends not only…

We establish finite-time last-iterate guarantees for vanilla stochastic gradient descent in co-coercive games under noisy feedback. This is a broad class of games that is more general than strongly monotone games, allows for multiple Nash…

In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. Our analysis starts with a normal form game involving two…

We consider learning Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum Markov Games with nonlinear function approximation, where the action-value function is approximated by a function in a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS). The key challenge is…

The distributed computation of Nash equilibria is assuming growing relevance in engineering where such problems emerge in the context of distributed control. Accordingly, we present schemes for computing equilibria of two classes of static…

This work proposes a novel set of techniques for approximating a Nash equilibrium in a finite, normal-form game. It achieves this by constructing a new reformulation as solving a parameterized system of multivariate polynomials with tunable…

Stochastic games have become a prevalent framework for studying long-term multi-agent interactions, especially in the context of multi-agent reinforcement learning. In this work, we comprehensively investigate the concept of constant-memory…

We study stochastic effects on the lagging anchor dynamics, a reinforcement learning algorithm used to learn successful strategies in iterated games, which is known to converge to Nash points in the absence of noise. The dynamics is…

We introduce the safe linear stochastic bandit framework---a generalization of linear stochastic bandits---where, in each stage, the learner is required to select an arm with an expected reward that is no less than a predetermined (safe)…