Related papers: LQG Differential Stackelberg Game under Nested Obs…

We present a linear--quadratic Stackelberg game with a large number of followers and we also derive the mean field limit of infinitely many followers. The relation between optimization and mean-field limit is studied and conditions for…

We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…

This paper considers the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel. We model the interaction between selfish users as a non-cooperative game. As opposed to the existing…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…

In this paper, we investigate a class of nonzero-sum dynamic stochastic games, where players have linear dynamics and quadratic cost functions. The players are coupled in both dynamics and cost through a linear regression (weighted average)…

Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…

In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience.…

This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…

Linear-quadratic Gaussian games provide a framework for modeling strategic interactions in multi-agent systems, where agents must estimate system states from noisy observations while also making decisions to optimize a quadratic cost.…

The paper is devoted to inverse Stackelberg games with many players. We consider both static and differential games. The main assumption of the paper is the compactness of the strategy sets. We obtain the characterization of inverse…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

We formulate a two-team linear quadratic stochas- tic dynamic game featuring two opposing teams each with decentralized information structures. We introduce the concept of mutual quadratic invariance (MQI), which, analogously to quadratic…

We formulate a new class of two-person zero-sum differential games, in a stochastic setting, where a specification on a target terminal state distribution is imposed on the players. We address such added specification by introducing…

This paper focuses on a kind of linear quadratic non-zero sum differential game driven by backward stochastic differential equation with asymmetric information, which is a natural continuation of Wang and Yu [IEEE TAC (2010) 55: 1742-1747,…

We address Stackelberg models of combinatorial congestion games (CCGs); we aim to optimize the parameters of CCGs so that the selfish behavior of non-atomic players attains desirable equilibria. This model is essential for designing such…

This paper considers a class of mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games with model uncertainty. The drift term in the dynamics of the agents contains a common unknown function. We take a robust optimization approach where a…

Trajectory guidance requires a leader robotic agent to assist a follower robotic agent to cooperatively reach the target destination. However, planning cooperation becomes difficult when the leader serves a family of different followers and…

Strategic interaction in congested systems is commonly modelled using Stackelberg games, where competing leaders anticipate the behaviour of self-interested followers. A key limitation of existing models is that they typically ignore agents…