Related papers: Efficient Phi-Regret Minimization in Extensive-For…
We study adversarial online learning with hidden-convex losses, i.e., nonconvex losses that become convex after a nonlinear reparameterization. Ghai, Lu and Hazan (2022) proved that, under geometric and smoothness assumptions, online…
We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the…
We address the online linear optimization problem with bandit feedback. Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide an algorithm (based on exponential weights) with a regret of order $\sqrt{d n \log N}$ for any finite action set with $N$…
Constructing effective algorithms to converge to Nash Equilibrium (NE) is an important problem in algorithmic game theory. Prior research generally posits that the upper bound on the convergence rate for games is $O\left(T^{-1/2}\right)$.…
We consider the use of no-regret algorithms to compute equilibria for particular classes of convex-concave games. While standard regret bounds would lead to convergence rates on the order of $O(T^{-1/2})$, recent work \citep{RS13,SALS15}…
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
In this paper, we revisit the online non-monotone continuous DR-submodular maximization problem over a down-closed convex set, which finds wide real-world applications in the domain of machine learning, economics, and operations research.…
Last-iterate convergence of learning dynamics in games has attracted significant recent attention. In two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback, where only the loss of the selected action pair is observed, Fiegel et al. (2025) show a…
Researchers on artificial intelligence have achieved human-level intelligence in large-scale perfect-information games, but it is still a challenge to achieve (nearly) optimal results (in other words, an approximate Nash Equilibrium) in…
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…
We consider the problem of efficiently learning to play single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg games when the leader lacks knowledge of the lower-level game. Such games arise in hierarchical decision-making problems involving…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the dominant algorithmic family for solving large imperfect-information games, underpinning breakthroughs such as Libratus and Pluribus in No-Limit Texas Hold'em poker. In real-time game-playing…
We consider online no-regret learning in unknown games with bandit feedback, where each player can only observe its reward at each time -- determined by all players' current joint action -- rather than its gradient. We focus on the class of…
Function approximation (FA) has been a critical component in solving large zero-sum games. Yet, little attention has been given towards FA in solving \textit{general-sum} extensive-form games, despite them being widely regarded as being…
A recent line of work has established uncoupled learning dynamics such that, when employed by all players in a game, each player's \emph{regret} after $T$ repetitions grows polylogarithmically in $T$, an exponential improvement over the…
Second-order optimization techniques have the potential to achieve faster convergence rates compared to first-order methods through the incorporation of second-order derivatives or statistics. However, their utilization in deep learning is…
Mean field games (MFG) and mean field control problems (MFC) are frameworks to study Nash equilibria or social optima in games with a continuum of agents. These problems can be used to approximate competitive or cooperative games with a…
In a recent series of papers it has been established that variants of Gradient Descent/Ascent and Mirror Descent exhibit last iterate convergence in convex-concave zero-sum games. Specifically, \cite{DISZ17, LiangS18} show last iterate…
Mean-field games (MFG) have become significant tools for solving large-scale multi-agent reinforcement learning problems under symmetry. However, the assumption of exact symmetry limits the applicability of MFGs, as real-world scenarios…
Despite the notable successes in video games such as Atari 2600, current AI is yet to defeat human champions in the domain of real-time strategy (RTS) games. One of the reasons is that an RTS game is a multi-agent game, in which…