Related papers: 2-Dimensional Euclidean Preferences
A preference profile with $m$ alternatives and $n$ voters is $d$-Manhattan (resp. $d$-Euclidean) if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into the $d$-dimensional space such that between each pair of alternatives, every voter…
We characterize one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles with a small number of alternatives and voters. In particular, we show the following. 1. Every preference profile with up to two voters is one-dimensional Euclidean if and only…
Euclidean preferences are a widely studied preference model, in which decision makers and alternatives are embedded in d-dimensional Euclidean space. Decision makers prefer those alternatives closer to them. This model, also known as…
Spatial models of preference, in the form of vector embeddings, are learned by many deep learning and multiagent systems, including recommender systems. Often these models are assumed to approximate a Euclidean structure, where an…
An election is a pair $(C,V)$ of candidates and voters. Each vote is a ranking (permutation) of the candidates. An election is $d$-Euclidean if there is an embedding of both candidates and voters into $\mathbb{R}^d$ such that voter $v$…
We present various results about Euclidean preferences in the plane under $\ell_1$, $\ell_2$ and $\ell_{\infty}$ norms. When there are four candidates, we show that the maximal size (in terms of the number of pairwise distinct preferences)…
Whether the goal is to analyze voting behavior, locate facilities, or recommend products, the problem of translating between (ordinal) rankings and (numerical) utilities arises naturally in many contexts. This task is commonly approached by…
Given a finite set $S$ of points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, which we regard as the locations of voters on a $d$-dimensional political `spectrum', two candidates (Alice and Bob) select one point in $\mathbb{R}^d$ each, in an attempt to get as many…
We show that one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles can not be characterized in terms of finitely many forbidden substructures. This result is in strong contrast to the case of single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles,…
We study the 3D-Euclidean Multidimensional Stable Roommates problem, which asks whether a given set $V$ of $s\cdot n$ agents with a location in 3-dimensional Euclidean space can be partitioned into $n$ disjoint subsets $\pi = \{R_1 ,\dots ,…
We consider multiwinner elections in Euclidean space using the minimax Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this setting, voters and candidates are embedded in a $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and the goal is to choose a committee of $k$…
In multiple-question referendum elections, the separability problem occurs when a voter's preferences on some questions or proposals depend on the predicted outcomes of others. The notion of separability formalizes the study of…
For multidimensional Euclidean type spaces, we study convex choice: from any choice set, the set of types that make the same choice is convex. We establish that, in a suitable sense, this property characterizes the sufficiency of local…
We consider spatial voting where candidates are located in the Euclidean $d$-dimensional space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their distance from the voter's ideal point. We explore the case where information about the location…
Multidimensional unfolding methods are widely used for visualizing item response data. Such methods project respondents and items simultaneously onto a low-dimensional Euclidian space, in which respondents and items are represented by ideal…
The paper suggests a new --- to the best of the author's knowledge --- characterization of decisions which are optimal in the multi-objective optimization problem with respect to a definite proper preference cone, a Euclidean cone with a…
We consider a spatial voting model where both candidates and voters are positioned in the $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their proximity to the voter's ideal point. We focus on the scenario where…
The assumption that voters' preferences share some common structure is a standard way to circumvent NP-hardness results in social choice problems. While the Kemeny ranking problem is NP-hard in the general case, it is known to become easy…
We use decision theory to compare variants of differential privacy from the perspective of prospective study participants. We posit the existence of a preference ordering on the set of potential consequences that study participants can…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…