Related papers: No-Regret Learning in Network Stochastic Zero-Sum …

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population…

We consider the trade-off problem between exploration and exploitation under finite discounted Markov Decision Process, where the state transition matrix of the underlying environment stays unknown. We propose a double Thompson sampling…

This paper is concerned with distributed stochastic multi-agent constrained optimization problem over time-varying network with a class of communication noise. This paper considers the problem in composite optimization setting which is more…

Regret Matching+ (RM+) and its variants are important algorithms for solving large-scale games. However, a theoretical understanding of their success in practice is still a mystery. Moreover, recent advances on fast convergence in games are…

We study the problem of learning Nash equilibria in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. While existing approaches often rely on explicit pessimism to address distribution shift, we show that KL regularization alone suffices to…

This paper proposes a payoff perturbation technique for the Mirror Descent (MD) algorithm in games where the gradient of the payoff functions is monotone in the strategy profile space, potentially containing additive noise. The optimistic…

Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under…

Partial monitoring is a general model for sequential learning with limited feedback formalized as a game between two players. In this game, the learner chooses an action and at the same time the opponent chooses an outcome, then the learner…

We study risk-sensitive multi-agent reinforcement learning under general-sum Markov games, where agents optimize the entropic risk measure of rewards with possibly diverse risk preferences. We show that using the regret naively adapted from…

This work studies Nash equilibrium seeking for a class of stochastic aggregative games, where each player has an expectation-valued objective function depending on its local strategy and the aggregate of all players' strategies. We propose…

As one of the most popular methods in the field of reinforcement learning, Q-learning has received increasing attention. Recently, there have been more theoretical works on the regret bound of algorithms that belong to the Q-learning class…

We show that Optimistic Hedge -- a common variant of multiplicative-weights-updates with recency bias -- attains ${\rm poly}(\log T)$ regret in multi-player general-sum games. In particular, when every player of the game uses Optimistic…

We study the convergence of Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent in unconstrained bilinear games. In a first part, we consider the zero-sum case and extend previous results by Daskalakis et al. in 2018, Liang and Stokes in 2019, and others:…

In this paper, we present an online learning approach for two-player zero-sum linear quadratic games with unknown dynamics. We develop a framework combining regularized least squares model estimation, high probability confidence sets, and…

We address the online linear optimization problem with bandit feedback. Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide an algorithm (based on exponential weights) with a regret of order $\sqrt{d n \log N}$ for any finite action set with $N$…

In a recent series of papers it has been established that variants of Gradient Descent/Ascent and Mirror Descent exhibit last iterate convergence in convex-concave zero-sum games. Specifically, \cite{DISZ17, LiangS18} show last iterate…

Many recent AI architectures are inspired by zero-sum games, however, the behavior of their dynamics is still not well understood. Inspired by this, we study standard gradient descent ascent (GDA) dynamics in a specific class of non-convex…

Computational tractability and social welfare (aka. efficiency) of equilibria are two fundamental but in general orthogonal considerations in algorithmic game theory. Nevertheless, we show that when (approximate) full efficiency can be…

We argue that the existing regret matchings for Nash equilibrium approximation conduct "jumpy" strategy updating when the probabilities of future plays are set to be proportional to positive regret measures. We propose a geometrical regret…

We study an algorithmic equivalence technique between non-convex gradient descent and convex mirror descent. We start by looking at a harder problem of regret minimization in online non-convex optimization. We show that under certain…