Related papers: On Hedonic Games with Common Ranking Property
Many real-world decision problems involve the interaction of multiple self-interested agents with limited sensing ability. The partially observable stochastic game (POSG) provides a mathematical framework for modeling these problems,…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
First, we consider the problem of deciding whether a nonlocal game admits a perfect entangled strategy that uses projective measurements on a maximally entangled shared state. Via a polynomial-time Karp reduction, we show that independent…
We study two-player general sum repeated finite games where the rewards of each player are generated from an unknown distribution. Our aim is to find the egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) for the repeated game, which can lead to much…
Coalition formation explores how to partition a set of $n$ agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. We consider a cardinal utility model with an additively separable aggregation of preferences and study the online…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
We study a fingerprinting game in which the number of colluders and the collusion channel are unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host sequence and provides the decoder with the capability to trace back pirated copies to the…
This paper proposes Hodge Potential Choice (HPC), a new solution for abstract games with irreflexive dominance relations. This solution is formulated by involving geometric tools like differential forms and Hodge decomposition onto abstract…
In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…
This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given $m$ random samples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative game; can we predict the…
In coalitional games, a player $i$ is regarded as strictly more desirable than player $j$ if substituting $j$ with $i$ within any coalition leads to a strict augmentation in the value of certain coalitions, while preserving the value of the…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many…
Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
In this paper, we propose a bilateral peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading scheme under single-contract and multi-contract market setups, both as an assignment game, and a special class of coalitional games. {The proposed market formulation…
Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…
We analyze the problem of computing a correlated equilibrium that optimizes some objective (e.g., social welfare). Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] gave a sufficient condition for the tractability of this problem; however, this…
Value iteration is a commonly used and empirically competitive method in solving many Markov decision process problems. However, it is known that value iteration has only pseudo-polynomial complexity in general. We establish a somewhat…