Related papers: Information Design of Dynamic Mechanisms
Multi-agent systems often operate under feedback, adaptation, and non-stationarity, yet many simulation studies retain static decision rules and fixed control parameters. This paper introduces a general adaptive multi-agent learning…
Social networks have become ubiquitous in our daily life, as such it has attracted great research interests recently. A key challenge is that it is of extremely large-scale with tremendous information flow, creating the phenomenon of "Big…
We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…
We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally…
Dynamics of arbitrary communication system is analysed as unreduced interaction process. The applied generalised, universally nonperturbative method of effective potential reveals the phenomenon of dynamic multivaluedness of competing…
Modeling a structured, dynamic environment like a video game requires keeping track of the objects and their states declarative knowledge) as well as predicting how objects behave (procedural knowledge). Black-box models with a monolithic…
Inspired by previous work on emergent communication in referential games, we propose a novel multi-modal, multi-step referential game, where the sender and receiver have access to distinct modalities of an object, and their information…
In order to facilitate analyzing video games as learning systems and instructional designs as games, we present a theoretical framework that integrates ideas from a broad range of literature. The framework describes games in terms of four…
The note is devoted to an interactive game theoretic formalization of dialogues as psycholinguistic phenomena and the unraveling of a hidden dialogue structure of 2-person differential interactive games. In the field-theoretic description…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
Randomized experiments can be susceptible to selection bias due to potential non-compliance by the participants. While much of the existing work has studied compliance as a static behavior, we propose a game-theoretic model to study…
Flexible information routing fundamentally underlies the function of many biological and artificial networks. Yet, how such systems may specifically communicate and dynamically route information is not well understood. Here we identify a…
Information flow policies are often dynamic; the security concerns of a program will typically change during execution to reflect security-relevant events. A key challenge is how to best specify, and give proper meaning to, such dynamic…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…
Behavior trees represent a hierarchical and modular way of combining several low-level control policies into a high-level task-switching policy. Hybrid dynamical systems can also be seen in terms of task switching between different…
A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…
Data-driven predictions are often perceived as inaccurate in hindsight due to behavioral responses. In this study, we explore the role of interface design choices in shaping individuals' decision-making processes in response to predictions…
We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…
How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-timescale learning dynamics to answer this question in both…
As a contribution to the challenge of building game-playing AI systems, we develop and analyse a formal language for representing and reasoning about strategies. Our logical language builds on the existing general Game Description Language…