Related papers: Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via I…
We derive asymptotically optimal statistical decision rules for discrete choice problems when payoffs depend on a partially-identified parameter $\theta$ and the decision maker can use a point-identified parameter $\mu$ to deduce…
We study the manipulability of social choice correspondences in situations where individuals have incomplete information about others' preferences. We propose a general concept of manipulability that depends on the extension rule used to…
Mathematical Selection is a method in which we select a particular choice from a set of such. It have always been an interesting field of study for mathematicians. Combinatorial optimisation is the practice of selecting the best constituent…
We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under Impartial Culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters that must be…
In a delegation problem, a principal P with commitment power tries to pick one out of $n$ options. Each option is drawn independently from a known distribution. Instead of inspecting the options herself, P delegates the information…
In a previous paper, a process algebra based on ACP (Algebra of Communicating Processes) was proposed in which processes involving data can be handled by means of features originating from imperative programming. In this paper, an extension…
Classification with abstention has gained a lot of attention in recent years as it allows to incorporate human decision-makers in the process. Yet, abstention can potentially amplify disparities and lead to discriminatory predictions. The…
Many important decisions in societies such as school admissions, hiring, or elections are based on the selection of top-ranking individuals from a larger pool of candidates. This process is often subject to biases, which typically manifest…
Leader Election is an important primitive for programmable matter, since it is often an intermediate step for the solution of more complex problems. Although the leader election problem itself is well studied even in the specific context of…
We propose a novel method for selective classification (SC), a problem which allows a classifier to abstain from predicting some instances, thus trading off accuracy against coverage (the fraction of instances predicted). In contrast to…
A structured variable selection problem is considered in which the covariates, divided into predefined groups, activate according to sparse patterns with few nonzero entries per group. Capitalizing on the concept of atomic norm, a composite…
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is selected. Prior work has adapted popular notions of…
As society transitions towards an AI-based decision-making infrastructure, an ever-increasing number of decisions once under control of humans are now delegated to automated systems. Even though such developments make various parts of…
We introduce a framework for incremental-decremental maximization that captures the gradual transformation or renewal of infrastructures. In our model, an initial solution is transformed one element at a time and the utility of an…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
This paper studies delegation in a model of discrete choice. In the delegation problem, an uninformed principal must consult an informed agent to make a decision. Both the agent and principal have preferences over the decided-upon action…
We explore the connection between an agent's decision problem and her ranking of information structures. We find that a finite amount of ordinal data on the agent's ranking of experiments is enough to identify her (finite) set of…
A planner wants to select one agent out of n agents on the basis of a binary characteristic that is commonly known to all agents but is not observed by the planner. Any pair of agents can either be friends or enemies or impartials of each…
We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…