Related papers: The Value of Information in Stopping Problems
In this paper, we explore a scenario where a sender provides an information policy and a receiver, upon observing a realization of this policy, decides whether to take a particular action, such as making a purchase. The sender's objective…
We propose indifference pricing to estimate the value of the weak information. Our framework allows for tractability, quantifying the amount of additional information, and permits the description of the smallness and the stability with…
Decision makers involved in the management of civil assets and systems usually take actions under constraints imposed by societal regulations. Some of these constraints are related to epistemic quantities, as the probability of failure…
I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal…
We analyze an optimal stopping problem with a constraint on the expected cost. When the reward function and cost function are Lipschitz continuous in state variable, we show that the value of such an optimal stopping problem is a continuous…
Appropriate decisions depend on information gathered beforehand, yet such information is often obtained through intermediaries with biased preferences. Motivated by settings such as testing and recertification in organ transplantation, we…
We study a discrete-time model where each packet has a cost of not being sent -- this cost might depend on the packet content. We study the tradeoff between the age and the cost where the sender is confined to packet-based strategies. The…
Robbins' problem of optimal stopping asks one to minimise the expected {\it rank} of observation chosen by some nonanticipating stopping rule. We settle a conjecture regarding the {\it value} of the stopped variable under the rule optimal…
The recently proposed set-up of source coding with a side information "vending machine" allows the decoder to select actions in order to control the quality of the side information. The actions can depend on the message received from the…
People often face trade-offs between costs and benefits occurring at various points in time. The predominant discounting approach is to use the exponential form. Central to this approach is the discount rate, a unique parameter that…
When a new product or technology is introduced, potential consumers can learn its quality by trying the product, at a risk, or by letting others try it and free-riding on the information that they generate. We propose a dynamic game to…
Mobile users' correlated mobility and data consumption patterns often lead to severe cellular network congestion in peak hours and hot spots. This paper presents an optimal design of time and location aware mobile data pricing, which…
A first attempt at obtaining market--directional information from a non--stationary solution of the dynamic equation "future price tends to the value that maximizes the number of shares traded per unit time" [1] is presented. We demonstrate…
An attempt to obtain market directional information from non-stationary solution of the dynamic equation: "future price tends to the value maximizing the number of shares traded per unit time" is presented. A remarkable feature of the…
For an infinite-horizon continuous-time optimal stopping problem under non-exponential discounting, we look for an optimal equilibrium, which generates larger values than any other equilibrium does on the entire state space. When the…
Precise information is essential for making good policies, especially those regarding reform decisions. However, decision-makers may hesitate to gather such information if certain decisions could have negative impacts on their future…
Perfectly rational decision-makers maximize expected utility, but crucially ignore the resource costs incurred when determining optimal actions. Here we propose an information-theoretic formalization of bounded rational decision-making…
I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before…
A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism in…
The problem of reinforcement learning is considered where the environment or the model undergoes a change. An algorithm is proposed that an agent can apply in such a problem to achieve the optimal long-time discounted reward. The algorithm…