Related papers: Two-sided matching with firms' complementary prefe…
We study a two-sided matching model where one side of the market (hospitals) has combinatorial preferences over the other side (doctors). Specifically, we consider the setting where hospitals have matroid rank valuations over the doctors,…
We study the graphs formed from instances of the stable matching problem by connecting pairs of elements with an edge when there exists a stable matching in which they are matched. Our results include the NP-completeness of recognizing…
Recommendation systems for online dating have recently attracted much attention from the research community. In this paper we proposed a two-side matching framework for online dating recommendations and design an LDA model to learn the user…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972),…
We study a two-institution stable matching model in which candidates from two distinct groups are evaluated using partially correlated signals that are group-biased. This extends prior work (which assumes institutions evaluate candidates in…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
A social choice correspondence satisfies balancedness if, for every pair of alternatives, x and y, and every pair of individuals, i and j, whenever a profile has x adjacent to but just above y for individual i while individual j has y…
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions…
This paper explores a new class of incomplete preferences -- termed ``connected preferences'' -- in which maximal domains of comparability are topologically connected. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for continuous…
This paper studies multilateral matching in which agents may negotiate contracts within any coalition. We assume scale economies such that an agent substitutes some existing contracts with new ones only if the latter involve a set of…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
I study how organisations choose selection procedures in a competitive environment. Two firms compete to hire candidates of unknown productivity from a common pool. Firms simultaneously post a selection procedure which consists of a test…
We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
Bipartite matching problem is to study two disjoint groups of agents who need to be matched pairwise. It can be applied to many real-world scenarios and explain many social phenomena. In this article, we study the effect of competition on…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
We study the existence of equilibrium when agents' preferences may not beconvex. For some specific utility functions, we provide a necessary and sufficientcondition under which there exists an equilibrium. The standard approach cannot be…
We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G$ where every vertex has a capacity and a strict preference order on its neighbors. Furthermore, there is a cost function on the edge set. We assume $G$ admits a perfect matching, i.e.,…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…