Related papers: Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantu…
Semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are commonly used for single photon detection in quantum key distribution. Recently, many attacks using bright illumination have been proposed to manipulate gated InGaAs APDs. In order to devise…
The eavesdropper technique nowadays is already improved from the theoretical perspective to the experimental perspective. The technique now more focusing on the loopholes of the components used such as modulator, laser, and detector. These…
We present a countermeasure against the detector blinding attack (DBA) utilizing statistical analysis of error and double-click events accumulated during a quantum key distribution session under randomized modulation of single-photon…
Single photon detectors based on passively-quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than a nanowatt. I describe a bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key…
Single-photon detectors (SPDs) are the most sensitive instruments for light detection. In the near-infrared range, SPDs based on III-V compound semiconductor avalanche photodiodes have been extensively used during the past two decades for…
Fast gated avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are the most commonly used single photon detectors for high bit rate quantum key distribution (QKD). Their robustness against external attacks is crucial to the overall security of a QKD system or…
We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a…
We introduce the concept of a superlinear threshold detector, a detector that has a higher probability to detect multiple photons if it receives them simultaneously rather than at separate times. Highly superlinear threshold detectors in…
Vulnerabilities and imperfections of single-photon detectors have been shown to compromise security for quantum key distribution (QKD). The measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) appears to be the most appealing solution to solve the…
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution provides a theoretical unconditionally secure solution to distribute symmetric keys among users in a communication network. However, the practical devices used to implement these systems are…
Quantum key distribution is unbreakable in theory but may be hacked via imperfections in its hardware implementations. While many imperfections have been mitigated by countermeasures and advanced security proofs, several remain unsolved.…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic secure key as long as the device performs as assumed in the theoretical model. One of the assumptions is an absence of information leakage about individual photon detection…
Modern single-photon detectors based on avalanche photodiodes offer increasingly higher triggering speeds, thus fostering their use in several fields, prominently in the recent area of Quantum Key Distribution. To reduce the probability of…
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely…
Single-photon detectors have achieved impressive performance, and have led to a number of new scientific discoveries and technological applications. Existing models of photodetectors are semiclassical in that the field-matter interaction is…
By employing real-time monitoring of single-photon avalanche photodiodes we demonstrate how two types of practical eavesdropping strategies, the after-gate and time-shift attacks, may be detected. Both attacks are identified with the…
Quantum Key Distribution with the BB84 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in…
General Trojan horse attacks on quantum key distribution systems are analyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today's technology and conclude that all system must implement active counter-measures. In particular all systems…
We demonstrate a practical countermeasure against a well-known class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems that exploit detection efficiency mismatch, where the receiver's detectors do not exhibit identical responses to…
The information theoretic security promised by quantum key distribution (QKD) holds as long as the assumptions in the theoretical model match the parameters in the physical implementation. The superlinear behaviour of sensitive…