Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography

Z L Yuan; J F Dynes; A J Shields

doi:10.1038/nphoton.2010.269

Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography

Quantum Physics 2010-12-06 v1

Authors: Z L Yuan , J F Dynes , A J Shields

View on arXiv ↗ PDF ↗ DOI ↗

Abstract

We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a redundant resistor is included in series with the APD, or if the detector discrimination levels are set inappropriately.

Keywords

single-photon avalanche diodes

Cite

@article{arxiv.1009.6130,
  title  = {Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography},
  author = {Z L Yuan and J F Dynes and A J Shields},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1009.6130},
  year   = {2010}
}

Related papers

View all related →