Related papers: Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum C…
Semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are commonly used for single photon detection in quantum key distribution. Recently, many attacks using bright illumination have been proposed to manipulate gated InGaAs APDs. In order to devise…
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the…
The eavesdropper technique nowadays is already improved from the theoretical perspective to the experimental perspective. The technique now more focusing on the loopholes of the components used such as modulator, laser, and detector. These…
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these…
A particularly successful detector blinding attack has been recently demonstrated on various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, performing for the first time an undetectable and complete recovery of the key. In this paper two original…
We developed a countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with a background noise cancellation scheme in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Background noise cancellation includes self-differencing and balanced…
Implementation of high-speed quantum key distribution~(QKD) has become one of the major focus in the field, which produces high key-generation rate for applications. To achieve high-speed QKD, tailored techniques are developed and employed…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a…
Fast gated avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are the most commonly used single photon detectors for high bit rate quantum key distribution (QKD). Their robustness against external attacks is crucial to the overall security of a QKD system or…
In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding…
We experimentally demonstrate optical control of negative-feedback avalanche diode (NFAD) detectors using bright light. We deterministically generate fake single-photon detections with a better timing precision than normal operation. This…
Single photon detectors based on passively-quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than a nanowatt. I describe a bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key…
In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully…
In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating…
A photon detector combining the two avalanche photon diodes (APD) has been demonstrated for qubit discrimination in 1550 nm. Spikes accompanied with the signals in gated-mode were canceled by balanced output from the two APDs. The spike…
Silicon avalanche photodiodes are the most sensitive photodetectors in the visible to near infrared region. However, when they are used for single photon detection in a Geiger mode, they are known to emit light on the controlled breakdown…
This is a Reply to the Comment by Lydersen et al. [arXiv: 1106.3756v1].
Avalanche photodiodes are widely used as practical detectors of single photons.1 Although conventional devices respond to one or more photons, they cannot resolve the number in the incident pulse or short time interval. However, such photon…
Detector blinding attacks have been proposed in the last few years, and they could potentially threaten the security of QKD systems. Even though no complete QKD system has been hacked yet, it is nevertheless important to consider…
This is a reply to the comment by Yuan et al. [arXiv:1009.6130v1] on our publication [arXiv:1008.4593].