Related papers: A Unified Perspective on Deep Equilibrium Finding

Large language model-based Recommender Systems (LRSs) have demonstrated superior recommendation performance by integrating pre-training with Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). However, this approach introduces item-side unfairness. Existing…

Deep Research agents tackle knowledge-intensive tasks through multi-round retrieval and decision-oriented generation. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been shown to improve performance in this paradigm, its contributions remain…

Deep reinforcement learning has been shown to be a powerful framework for learning policies from complex high-dimensional sensory inputs to actions in complex tasks, such as the Atari domain. In this paper, we explore output representation…

Large-scale alignment pipelines typically pair a policy model with a separately trained reward model whose parameters remain frozen during reinforcement learning (RL). This separation creates a complex, resource-intensive pipeline and…

Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…

Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a family of algorithms for effectively solving imperfect-information games. To enhance CFR's applicability in large games, researchers use neural networks to approximate its behavior. However,…

Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) is a paradigm of artificial intelligence where an agent uses a neural network to learn which actions to take in a given environment. DRL has recently gained traction from being able to solve complex…

While deep reinforcement learning (RL) agents have showcased strong results across many domains, a major concern is their inherent opaqueness and the safety of such systems in real-world use cases. To overcome these issues, we need agents…

We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation (representing mistakes of…

In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…

In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to socially better outcomes with respect to Nash equilibria, and…

Artificial intelligence (AI) has surpassed top human players in a variety of games. In imperfect information games, these achievements have primarily been driven by Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and its variants for computing…

Recent years have witnessed significant advances in reinforcement learning (RL), which has registered great success in solving various sequential decision-making problems in machine learning. Most of the successful RL applications, e.g.,…

A dominant approach to solving large imperfect-information games is Counterfactural Regret Minimization (CFR). In CFR, many regret minimization problems are combined to solve the game. For very large games, abstraction is typically needed…

We study reinforcement learning for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves in the finite-horizon setting, where the transition kernel of the underlying Markov games can be parameterized by a linear function over the…

Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…

We address two major challenges of implicit coordination in multi-agent deep reinforcement learning: non-stationarity and exponential growth of state-action space, by combining Deep-Q Networks for policy learning with Nash equilibrium for…

A recent theory shows that a multi-player decentralized partially observable Markov decision process can be transformed into an equivalent single-player game, enabling the application of \citeauthor{bellman}'s principle of optimality to…

Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…