Related papers: A Unified Perspective on Deep Equilibrium Finding
This work studies non-cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) where multiple agents interact in the same environment and whose goal is to maximize the individual returns. Challenges arise when scaling up the number of agents…
Post-training paradigms for Large Language Models (LLMs), primarily Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL), face a fundamental dilemma: SFT provides stability (low variance) but suffers from high fitting bias, while RL…
Deep reinforcement learning has achieved many recent successes, but our understanding of its strengths and limitations is hampered by the lack of rich environments in which we can fully characterize optimal behavior, and correspondingly…
We develop a new approach that computes approximate equilibrium strategies in Jotto, a popular word game. Jotto is an extremely large two-player game of imperfect information; its game tree has many orders of magnitude more states than…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…
Reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms have proven transformative in a range of domains. To tackle real-world domains, these systems often use neural networks to learn policies directly from pixels or other high-dimensional sensory input.…
This paper addresses the problem of learning an equilibrium efficiently in general-sum Markov games through decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning. Given the fundamental difficulty of calculating a Nash equilibrium (NE), we…
Reinforcement Learning Fine-Tuning (RLFT) has achieved notable success in tasks with objectively verifiable answers (e.g., code generation, mathematical reasoning), yet struggles with open-ended subjective tasks like role-playing dialogue.…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the dominant algorithmic family for solving large imperfect-information games, underpinning breakthroughs such as Libratus and Pluribus in No-Limit Texas Hold'em poker. In real-time game-playing…
We investigate the challenge of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning in partially competitive environments, where traditional methods struggle to foster reciprocity-based cooperation. LOLA and POLA agents learn reciprocity-based…
A new game theoretical solution concept for open spectrum sharing in cognitive radio (CR) environments is presented, the Lorenz equilibrium (LE). Both Nash and Pareto solution concepts have limitations when applied to real world problems.…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
Noncooperative game-theoretic tools have been increasingly used to study many important resource allocation problems in communications, networking, smart grids, and portfolio optimization. In this paper, we consider a general class of…
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
Traditional solvable game theory and mean-field-type game theory (risk-aware games) predominantly focus on quadratic costs due to their analytical tractability. Nevertheless, they often fail to capture critical non-linearities inherent in…
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) algorithms are a foundational class of methods for solving imperfect-information games, with the time average of their iterates converging to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. Prior…
Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization (MCCFR) has emerged as a cornerstone algorithm for solving extensive-form games, but its integration with deep neural networks introduces scale-dependent challenges that manifest differently…
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is an effective algorithm for solving extensive games with imperfect information (IIEGs). However, CFR is only allowed to be applied in known environments, where the transition function of the chance…
We study model-based and model-free policy optimization in a class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games called linear quadratic (LQ) deep structured games. In such games, players interact with each other through a set of weighted…
This study investigates cooperation evolution mechanisms in the spatial public goods game. A novel deep reinforcement learning framework, Proximal Policy Optimization with Adversarial Curriculum Transfer (PPO-ACT), is proposed to model…