Related papers: Equilibrium Finding in Normal-Form Games Via Greed…

No-regret learning has been widely used to compute a Nash equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. However, there is still a lack of regret analysis for network stochastic zero-sum games, where players competing in two subnetworks only…

Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale problems; it was recently used in breakthrough results for large-scale extensive-form game solving. This was achieved by composing simplex regret minimizers into an overall…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is an efficient no-regret learning algorithm for decision problems modeled as extensive games. CFR's regret bounds depend on the requirement of perfect recall: players always remember information…

Estimating discrete games of complete information is often computationally difficult due to partial identification and the absence of closed-form moment characterizations. This paper proposes computationally tractable approaches to…

In this paper, we study the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem of non-cooperative games in dynamic environments. Each player in the game aims to minimize its own time-varying cost function subject to a local action…

We revisit the problem of solving two-player zero-sum games in the decentralized setting. We propose a simple algorithmic framework that simultaneously achieves the best rates for honest regret as well as adversarial regret, and in addition…

The policy iteration method is a classical algorithm for solving optimal control problems. In this paper, we introduce a policy iteration method for Mean Field Games systems, and we study the convergence of this procedure to a solution of…

Decoding how rational agents should behave in shared systems remains a critical challenge within theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence and economics studies. Central to this challenge is the task of computing the solution…

We propose a generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) built on a simple premise: some actions are more focal than others. In our model, which we call the Focal Quantal Response Equilibrium (Focal QRE), each player plays a…

In this paper, we consider a large class of hierarchical congestion population games. One can show that the equilibrium in a game of such type can be described as a minimum point in a properly constructed multi-level convex optimization…

We introduce Cautious Optimism, a framework for substantially faster regularized learning in general games. Cautious Optimism, as a variant of Optimism, adaptively controls the learning pace in a dynamic, non-monotone manner to accelerate…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…

We study the limiting behavior of the mixed strategies that result from optimal no-regret learning strategies in a repeated game setting where the stage game is any 2 by 2 competitive game. We consider optimal no-regret algorithms that are…

This paper studies online optimization from a high-level unified theoretical perspective. We not only generalize both Optimistic-DA and Optimistic-MD in normed vector space, but also unify their analysis methods for dynamic regret. Regret…

A celebrated result in the interface of online learning and game theory guarantees that the repeated interaction of no-regret players leads to a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) -- a natural game-theoretic solution concept. Despite the…

We show that a version of the generalised information ratio of Lattimore and Gyorgy (2020) determines the asymptotic minimax regret for all finite-action partial monitoring games provided that (a) the standard definition of regret is used…

In two-player zero-sum games, if both players minimize their average external regret, then the average of the strategy profiles converges to a Nash equilibrium. For n-player general-sum games, however, theoretical guarantees for regret…

We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to using a best-response oracle.…