Related papers: Finding all stable matchings with assignment const…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
The stable marriage problem has been introduced in order to describe a complex system where individuals attempt to optimise their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. Due to the potential large applicability of…
This paper gives an overview on and summarizes existing complexity and algorithmic results of some variants of the Stable Marriage and the Stable Roommates problems. The last section defines a list of stable matching problems mentioned in…
It is well known that every stable matching instance $I$ has a rotation poset $R(I)$ that can be computed efficiently and the downsets of $R(I)$ are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable matchings of $I$. Furthermore, for every poset…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents, although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
This paper has two objectives. One is to give a linear time algorithm that solves the stable roommates problem (i.e., obtains one stable matching) using the stable marriage problem. The idea is that a stable matching of a roommate instance…
The model of Dynamic Meta-Constraints has special activity constraints which can activate other constraints. It also has meta-constraints which range over other constraints. An algorithm is presented in which constraints can be assigned one…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
Super-stability and strong stability are properties of a matching in the stable matching problem with ties. In this paper, we introduce a common generalization of super-stability and strong stability, which we call non-uniform stability.…
We study a natural generalization of stable matching to the maximum weight stable matching problem and we obtain a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for it by reducing it to the problem of finding a maximum weight ideal cut in a DAG.…
The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
Many AI synthesis problems such as planning or scheduling may be modelized as constraint satisfaction problems (CSP). A CSP is typically defined as the problem of finding any consistent labeling for a fixed set of variables satisfying all…
The balance between convergence and diversity is a key issue of evolutionary multi-objective optimization. The recently proposed stable matching-based selection provides a new perspective to handle this balance under the framework of…