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The minimum-effort coordination game, having potentially important implications in both evolutionary biology and sociology, draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the…

In this paper, we study the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem of non-cooperative games in dynamic environments. Each player in the game aims to minimize its own time-varying cost function subject to a local action…

The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…

We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse…

We design a distributed algorithm for learning Nash equilibria over time-varying communication networks in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can access its own cost function and local feasible set, but can only…

Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…

We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria,…

We prove that in a normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium where each player randomizes uniformly among a set of O(log(m) + log(n)) pure strategies. This result induces an…

The design of coherent and efficient policies to address infectious diseases and their consequences requires to model not only epidemics dynamics, but also individual behaviors, as the latter has a strong influence on the former. In our…

In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We…

The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…

Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…

We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS…

In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…

Concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) are an ideal formalism for modelling probabilistic systems that feature multiple players or components with distinct objectives making concurrent, rational decisions. Examples include communication or…

Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…

In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…

In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…