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This paper introduces a novel payoff-based learning scheme for distributed optimization in repeatedly-played strategic-form games. Standard reinforcement-based learning exhibits several limitations with respect to their asymptotic…
Generative artificial intelligence (Generative AI), and in particular Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained significant popularity among researchers and industrial communities, paving the way for integrating LLMs in different domains,…
We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…
AI in Math deals with mathematics in a constructive manner so that reasoning becomes automated, less laborious, and less error-prone. For algorithms, the question becomes how to automate analyses for specific problems. For the first time,…
Reinforcement-based learning has attracted considerable attention both in modeling human behavior as well as in engineering, for designing measurement- or payoff-based optimization schemes. Such learning schemes exhibit several advantages,…
We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…
The Nash Equilibrium (NE), one of the elegant and fundamental concepts in game theory, plays a crucial part within various fields, including engineering and computer science. However, efficiently computing an NE in normal-form games remains…
Game theory is playing more and more important roles in understanding complex systems and in investigating intelligent machines with various uncertainties. As a starting point, we consider the classical two-player zero-sum linear-quadratic…
Navigating multiple tasks$\unicode{x2014}$for instance in succession as in continual or lifelong learning, or in distributions as in meta or multi-task learning$\unicode{x2014}$requires some notion of adaptation. Evolution over timescales…
We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical…
Constrained Markov games offer a formal mathematical framework for modeling multi-agent reinforcement learning problems where the behavior of the agents is subject to constraints. In this work, we focus on the recently introduced class of…
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
Reinforcement-based learning dynamics may exhibit several limitations when applied in a distributed setup. In (repeatedly-played) multi-player/action strategic-form games, and when each player applies an independent copy of the learning…
Artificially intelligent agents are increasingly being integrated into human decision-making: from large language model (LLM) assistants to autonomous vehicles. These systems often optimize their individual objective, leading to conflicts,…
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated as a black…
In this work, we introduce a learning model designed to meet the needs of applications in which computational resources are limited, and robustness and interpretability are prioritized. Learning problems can be formulated as constrained…
In this paper, we consider stochastic monotone Nash games where each player's strategy set is characterized by possibly a large number of explicit convex constraint inequalities. Notably, the functional constraints of each player may depend…
Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability,…
In this paper, we consider a learning problem among non-cooperative agents interacting in a time-varying system. Specifically, we focus on repeated linear quadratic network games, in which the network of interactions changes with time and…
Modern random access mechanisms combine packet repetitions with multi-user detection mechanisms at the receiver to maximize the throughput and reliability in massive Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios. However, optimizing the access policy,…