Related papers: Strategy Complexity of Reachability in Countable S…

Two-team zero-sum games are one of the most important paradigms in game theory. In this paper, we focus on finding an unexploitable equilibrium in large team games. An unexploitable equilibrium is a worst-case policy, where members in the…

Log-linear learning has been extensively studied in both the game theoretic and distributed control literature. It is appealing for many applications because it often guarantees that the agents' collective behavior will converge in…

We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely…

Technology development efforts in autonomy and cyber-defense have been evolving independently of each other, over the past decade. In this paper, we report our ongoing effort to integrate these two presently distinct areas into a single…

In this paper, we deepen the study of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player $0$ announces a strategy and Player $1$, having several objectives, responds rationally by following plays providing him Pareto-optimal…

The paper addresses the problem of optimization of a guaranteed (worst case) result for a control system driven by a controlling side in presence of a dynamical disturbance. The disturbances as functions of time are subject to functional…

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players…

We study countably infinite Markov decision processes with B\"uchi objectives, which ask to visit a given subset of states infinitely often. A question left open by T.P. Hill in 1979 is whether there always exist $\varepsilon$-optimal…

We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect…

We consider turn-based game arenas for which we investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve bundles of plays, that arise from some semantical motive. Typically, we can represent constraints on allowed…

We study the complexity of solving two-player infinite duration games played on a fixed finite graph, where the control of a node is not predetermined but rather assigned randomly. In classic random-turn games, control of each node is…

We introduce a two-player model of reinforcement learning with memory. Past actions of an iterated game are stored in a memory and used to determine player's next action. To examine the behaviour of the model some approximate methods are…

We define reachability games based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), where the players' actions are finely described as DEL action models. We first consider the setting where an external controller with perfect information interacts with an…

In general, finite concurrent two-player reachability games are only determined in a weak sense: the supremum probability to win can be approached via stochastic strategies, but cannot be realized. We introduce a class of concurrent games…

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…

We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…

Games on recursive game graphs can be used to reason about the control flow of sequential programs with recursion. In games over recursive game graphs, the most natural notion of strategy is the modular strategy, i.e., a strategy that is…

In two-player games on graph, the players construct an infinite path through the game graph and get a reward computed by a payoff function over infinite paths. Over weighted graphs, the typical and most studied payoff functions compute the…

Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…

When interacting with other decision-making agents in non-adversarial scenarios, it is critical for an autonomous agent to have inferable behavior: The agent's actions must convey their intention and strategy. We model the inferability…