Related papers: Fictitious Play with Maximin Initialization

Fictitious play is an algorithm for computing Nash equilibria of matrix games. Recently, machine learning variants of fictitious play have been successfully applied to complicated real-world games. This paper presents a simple modification…

Decentralised optimisation tasks are important components of multi-agent systems. These tasks can be interpreted as n-player potential games: therefore game-theoretic learning algorithms can be used to solve decentralised optimisation…

While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…

We study the performance of Fictitious Play, when used as a heuristic for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game. We exhibit a class of 2-player games having payoffs in the range [0,1] that show that Fictitious Play…

Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…

A mean-field game (MFG) seeks the Nash Equilibrium of a game involving a continuum of players, where the Nash Equilibrium corresponds to a fixed point of the best-response mapping. However, simple fixed-point iterations do not always…

Fictitious play is a popular learning algorithm in which players that utilize the history of actions played by the players and the knowledge of their own payoff matrix can converge to the Nash equilibrium under certain conditions on the…

It is now well known that decentralised optimisation can be formulated as a potential game, and game-theoretical learning algorithms can be used to find an optimum. One of the most common learning techniques in game theory is fictitious…

In 1964 Shapley devised a family of games for which fictitious play fails to converge to Nash equilibrium. The games are two-player non-zero-sum with 3 pure strategies per player. Shapley assumed that each player played a specific pure…

In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric $N$-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential…

We study two-layer neural networks in the mean field limit, where the number of neurons tends to infinity. In this regime, the optimization over the neuron parameters becomes the optimization over the probability measures, and by adding an…

We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…

This paper considers mean field games with optimal stopping time (OSMFGs) where agents make optimal exit decisions, the coupled obstacle and Fokker-Planck equations in such models pose challenges versus classic MFGs. This paper proposes a…

Many real-world domains contain multiple agents behaving strategically with probabilistic transitions and uncertain (potentially infinite) duration. Such settings can be modeled as stochastic games. While algorithms have been developed for…

In this paper, a Nash-type fictitious game framework is introduced to handle a time-inconsistent linear-quadratic optimal control. The Nash-type game in this framework is called fictitious as it is between the decision maker (called real…

We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm for stationary mean-field games, where the goal is to learn a pair of mean-field state and stationary policy that constitutes the Nash equilibrium. When viewing the mean-field state and the…

Stochastic differential games have been used extensively to model agents' competitions in Finance, for instance, in P2P lending platforms from the Fintech industry, the banking system for systemic risk, and insurance markets. The recently…

We develop the fictitious play algorithm in the context of the linear programming approach for mean field games of optimal stopping and mean field games with regular control and absorption. This algorithm allows to approximate the mean…

Fictitious play (FP) is a natural learning dynamic in two-player zero-sum games. Samuel Karlin conjectured in 1959 that FP converges at a rate of $O(t^{-1/2})$ to Nash equilibrium, where $t$ is the number of steps played. However,…

Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in $n$-player games, which builds the foundation for modern multi-agent learning algorithms. Although FP has provable…