Related papers: Multi-Unit Diffusion Auctions with Intermediaries

This paper studies an auction design problem for a seller to sell a commodity in a social network, where each individual (the seller or a buyer) can only communicate with her neighbors. The challenge to the seller is to design a mechanism…

Diffusion auction is an emerging business model where a seller aims to incentivise buyers in a social network to diffuse the auction information thereby attracting potential buyers. We focus on designing mechanisms for multi-unit diffusion…

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally…

We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and has a diminishing marginal utility valuation for the items.…

Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values, the…

To address the demand of exponentially increasing end users efficient use of limited spectrum is a necessity. For this, spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum band is required to cater to the…

To address the exponentially increasing data rate demands of end users, necessitates efficient spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands to cater to the temporal and spatial variations of…

Diffusion auction design for combinatorial settings is a long-standing challenge. One difficulty is that we cannot directly extend the solutions for simpler settings to combinatorial settings (like extending the Vickrey auction to VCG in…

Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design for which the main goal is to incentivize existing buyers to invite new buyers, who are their neighbors on a social network, to join an auction even though they are competitors.…

Building on the linear programming approach to competitive equilibrium pricing, we develop a general method for constructing iterative auctions that achieve Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcomes. We show how to transform a linear program…

In recent years, a new branch of auction models called diffusion auction has extended the traditional auction into social network scenarios. The diffusion auction models the auction as a networked market whose nodes are potential customers…

With the growth of networks, promoting products through social networks has become an important problem. For auctions in social networks, items are needed to be sold to agents in a network, where each agent can bid and also diffuse the sale…

We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…

Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the…

We design a fixed-price auction mechanism for a seller to sell multiple items in a tree-structured market. The buyers have independently drawn valuation from a uniform distribution, and the seller would like to incentivize buyers to invite…

In this paper we propose a mechanism for the allocation of pipeline capacities, assuming that the participants bidding for capacities do have subjective evaluation of various network routes. The proposed mechanism is based on the concept of…

Device-to-Device communication allows a cellular user (relay node) to relay data between the base station (BS) and another cellular user (destination node). We address the problem of designing reverse auctions to assign a relay node to each…

Redistribution mechanism design aims to redistribute the revenue collected by a truthful auction back to its participants without affecting the truthfulness. We study redistribution mechanisms for diffusion auctions, which is a new trend in…

We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We…

Diffusion auction refers to an emerging paradigm of online marketplace where an auctioneer utilises a social network to attract potential buyers. Diffusion auction poses significant privacy risks. From the auction outcome, it is possible to…