Related papers: Redistribution in Public Project Problems via Neur…
We consider a setting where $p$ public resources are to be allocated among $n$ competing and strategic agents so as to maximize social welfare (the objects should be allocated to those who value them the most). This is called allocative…
We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a…
We study a multi-round welfare-maximising mechanism design problem in instances where agents do not know their values. On each round, a mechanism first assigns an allocation each to a set of agents and charges them a price; at the end of…
Mechanism design is a central research branch in microeconomics. An effective mechanism can significantly improve performance and efficiency of social decisions under desired objectives, such as to maximize social welfare or to maximize…
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause…
We consider the optimization problem of a multi-resource, multi-unit VCG auction that produces an optimal, i.e., non-approximated, social welfare. We present an algorithm that solves this optimization problem with pseudo-polynomial…
Network utility maximization (NUM) is a general framework for designing distributed optimization algorithms for large-scale networks. An economic challenge arises in the presence of strategic agents' private information. Existing studies…
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a…
With the growth of networks, promoting products through social networks has become an important problem. For auctions in social networks, items are needed to be sold to agents in a network, where each agent can bid and also diffuse the sale…
We consider a network where strategic agents, who are contesting for allocation of resources, are divided into fixed groups. The network control protocol is such that within each group agents get to share the resource and across groups they…
Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling a public good to a group of agents by a principal in the correlated private value environment. We assume the principal only knows the expectations of the agents' values, but does not know the…
Redistribution mechanisms have been proposed for more efficient resource allocation but not for profit. We consider redistribution mechanism design in a setting where participants are connected and the resource owner is only connected to…
Designing mechanisms that leverage cooperation between agents has been a long-lasting goal in Multiagent Systems. The task is especially challenging when agents are selfish, lack common goals and face social dilemmas, i.e., situations in…
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many…
The resource allocation problem consists of the optimal distribution of a budget between agents in a group. We consider such a problem in the context of open systems, where agents can be replaced at some time instances. These replacements…
Social dilemmas present a significant challenge in multi-agent cooperation because individuals are incentivised to behave in ways that undermine socially optimal outcomes. Consequently, self-interested agents often avoid collective…
We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multi-dimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial)…
In this paper, we investigate the computational resource allocation problem in a distributed Ad-Hoc vehicular network with no centralized infrastructure support. To support the ever increasing computational needs in such a vehicular…