Related papers: Redistribution in Public Project Problems via Neur…

We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification of VCG to a less typical environment, namely where we do…

In this paper, we focus on solving a distributed convex optimization problem in a network, where each agent has its own convex cost function and the goal is to minimize the sum of the agents' cost functions while obeying the network…

Finding optimal bidding strategies for generation units in electricity markets would result in higher profit. However, it is a challenging problem due to the system uncertainty which is due to the unknown other generation units' strategies.…

We consider a general class of multi-agent games in networks, namely the generalized vertex coloring games (G-VCGs), inspired by real-life applications of the venue selection problem in events planning. Certain utility responding to the…

Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…

Many real-world systems such as taxi systems, traffic networks and smart grids involve self-interested actors that perform individual tasks in a shared environment. However, in such systems, the self-interested behaviour of agents produces…

We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…

This thesis explores a particular class of distributed optimization methods for various separable resource allocation problems, which are of high interest in a wide array of multi-agent settings. A distinctly motivating application for this…

We consider a probabilistic model for large-scale task allocation problems for multi-agent systems, aiming to determine an optimal deployment strategy that minimizes the overall transport cost. Specifically, we assign transportation agents…

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…

We study nonconvex distributed optimization in multiagent networks where the communications between nodes is modeled as a time-varying sequence of arbitrary digraphs. We introduce a novel broadcast-based distributed algorithmic framework…

Motivated by broad applications in various fields of engineering, we study a network resource allocation problem where the goal is to optimally allocate a fixed quantity of resources over a network of nodes. We consider large scale networks…

Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the ``power of the crowd'' to garner contributions towards public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to ``free-ride,'' resulting in the project not being funded. For single project…

Reinforcement learning algorithms in multi-agent systems deliver highly resilient and adaptable solutions for common problems in telecommunications,aerospace, and industrial robotics. However, achieving an optimal global goal remains a…

In this paper, a distributed optimal steady-state regulation problem is formulated and investigated for heterogeneous linear multi-agent systems subject to external disturbances. We aim to steer this high-order multi-agent network to a…

This paper presented insights into the implementation of transactive multi-agent systems over flow networks where local resources are decentralized. Agents have local resource demand and supply, and are interconnected through a flow network…

Mechanism design, a branch of economics, aims to design rules that can autonomously achieve desired outcomes in resource allocation and public decision making. The research on mechanism design using machine learning is called automated…

We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…

In the large collection of existing distributed algorithms for convex multi-agent optimization, only a handful of them provide convergence rate guarantees on agent networks with time-varying topologies, which, however, restrict the problem…

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally…