Related papers: Approval with Runoff
Given a set of items and a set of evaluators who all individually rank them, how do we aggregate these evaluations into a single societal ranking? Work in social choice and statistics has produced many aggregation methods for this problem,…
Recent years have seen an increase in the use of online deliberation platforms (DPs). One of the main objectives of DPs is to enhance democratic participation, by allowing citizens to post, comment, and vote on policy proposals. But in what…
Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in voting. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some…
We introduce a voting model with multi-agent ranked delegations. This model generalises liquid democracy in two aspects: first, an agent's delegation can use the votes of multiple other agents to determine their own -- for instance, an…
Given a mapping from a set of players to the leaves of a complete binary tree (called a seeding), a knockout tournament is conducted as follows: every round, every two players with a common parent compete against each other, and the winner…
Majority voting is considered an effective method to enhance chain-of-thought reasoning, as it selects the answer with the highest "self-consistency" among different reasoning paths (Wang et al., 2023). However, previous chain-of-thought…
When voter preferences are known in an incomplete (partial) manner, winner determination is commonly treated as the identification of the necessary and possible winners; these are the candidates who win in all completions or at least one…
The traditional axiomatic approach to voting is motivated by the problem of reconciling differences in subjective preferences. In contrast, a dominant line of work in the theory of voting over the past 15 years has considered a different…
We consider a family of binary triangular arrays, called approval ballot triangles (ABTs), that are in bijection with totally symmetric self-complementary plane partitions (TSSCPPs). These triangles correspond to a ballot process in which…
Predicting the winner of an election is a favorite problem both for news media pundits and computational social choice theorists. Since it is often infeasible to elicit the preferences of all the voters in a typical prediction scenario, a…
Scoring rules are widely used to rank athletes in sports and candidates in elections. Each position in each individual ranking is worth a certain number of points; the total sum of points determines the aggregate ranking. The question is…
Approval-preferential voting is problematical since it combines two different kinds of information that could by themselves lead to different choices. This article analyses the problem and studies a new proposal to deal with it. The…
Epistemic social choice aims at unveiling a hidden ground truth given votes, which are interpreted as noisy signals about it. We consider here a simple setting where votes consist of approval ballots: each voter approves a set of…
An electorate with fully-ranked innate preferences casts approval votes over a finite set of alternatives. As a result, only partial information about the true preferences is revealed to the voting authorities. In an effort to understand…
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial…
We consider opinion diffusion for undirected networks with sequential updates when the opinions of the agents are single-peaked preference rankings. Our starting point is the study of preserving single-peakedness. We identify voting rules…
We consider different choice procedures such as scoring rules, rules, using majority relation, value function and tournament matrix, which are used in social and multi-criteria choice problems. We focus on the study of the properties that…
The outcome of an election depends not only on which candidate is more popular, but also on how many of their voters actually turn out to vote. Here we consider a simple model in which voters abstain from voting if they think their vote…
We provide the first large-scale data collection of real-world approval-based committee elections. These elections have been conducted on the Polkadot blockchain as part of their Nominated Proof-of-Stake mechanism and contain around one…
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…