Related papers: Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium
There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…
In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…
A fundamental problem in noncooperative dynamic game theory is the computation of Nash equilibria under different information structures, which specify the information available to each agent during decision-making. Prior work has…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
We introduce and investigate certain $N$ player dynamic games on the line and in the plane that admit Coulomb gas dynamics as a Nash equilibrium. Most significantly, we find that the universal local limit of the equilibrium is sensitive to…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…
Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…
Existing settings of decentralized learning either require players to have full information or the system to have certain special structure that may be hard to check and hinder their applicability to practical systems. To overcome this, we…
Generative artificial intelligence (Generative AI), and in particular Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained significant popularity among researchers and industrial communities, paving the way for integrating LLMs in different domains,…
An open problem in linear quadratic (LQ) games has been characterizing the Nash equilibria. This problem has renewed relevance given the surge of work on understanding the convergence of learning algorithms in dynamic games. This paper…
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…
In another paper with the same name\cite{frame}, we proposed a new representation of Game Theory, but most results are given by specific examples and argument. In this paper, we try to prove the conclusions as far as we can, including a…
In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…