Related papers: Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium
It is common to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however, experimental studies have demonstrated that Nash equilibrium is often a poor description of human players' behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. In this…
We develop an equilibrium framework that relaxes the standard assumption that people have a correctly-specified view of their environment. Each player is characterized by a (possibly misspecified) subjective model, which describes the set…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
We develop a game-theoretic framework for predicting and steering the behavior of populations of large language models (LLMs) through Nash equilibrium (NE) analysis. To avoid the intractability of equilibrium computation in open-ended text…
Level-k thinking has been widely applied as a solution concept for games in normal form in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider level-k thinking in games in extensive form. Player's may learn about levels of opponents'…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a solution concept for complete information games, in which each player's objective function and feasible region depend on other players' actions. While numerical methods for finding GNE when players…
Considering infinite-horizon, discrete-time, linear quadratic, N-player dynamic games with scalar dynamics, a graphical representation of feedback Nash equilibrium solutions is provided. This representation is utilised to derive conditions…
Strategic games admit a multi-graph representation, in which two kinds of relations, accessibility, and preferences, are used to describe how the players compare the possible outcomes. A category of games with a fixed set of players…
$S$ equilibrium synthesizes a century of game-theoretic modeling. $S$-beliefs determine choices as in the refinement literature and level-$k$, without anchoring on Nash equilibrium or imposing ad hoc belief formation. $S$-choices allow for…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central concept in game theory. Here we prove formally a published theorem on existence of an NE in two proof assistants, Coq and Isabelle: starting from a game with finitely many outcomes, one may derive a game…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
Systems of competing agents can often be modeled as games. Assuming rationality, the most likely outcomes are given by an equilibrium (e.g. a Nash equilibrium). In many practical settings, games are influenced by context, i.e. additional…
This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…
The study of games and their equilibria is central to developing insights for understanding many socio-economic phenomena. Here we present a dynamical systems view of the equilibria of two-person, payoff-symmetric games. In particular,…
In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…