Related papers: No-Regret Learning in Partially-Informed Auctions
We introduce a new numerical framework to learn optimal bidding strategies in repeated auctions when the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. Crucially, we do not assume that the bidders know what optimization mechanism is used…
We consider a setting where a system learns to rank a fixed set of $m$ items. The goal is produce good item rankings for users with diverse interests who interact online with the system for $T$ rounds. We consider a novel top-$1$ feedback…
In the contextual pricing problem a seller repeatedly obtains products described by an adversarially chosen feature vector in $\mathbb{R}^d$ and only observes the purchasing decisions of a buyer with a fixed but unknown linear valuation…
We study online linear regression problems in a distributed setting, where the data is spread over a network. In each round, each network node proposes a linear predictor, with the objective of fitting the \emph{network-wide} data. It then…
We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only the equilibrium price and quantity are…
We present a new recommendation setting for picking out two items from a given set to be highlighted to a user, based on contextual input. These two items are presented to a user who chooses one of them, possibly stochastically, with a bias…
We study how a budget-constrained bidder should learn to adaptively bid in repeated first-price auctions to maximize her cumulative payoff. This problem arose due to an industry-wide shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions…
Crucial performance metrics of a caching algorithm include its ability to quickly and accurately learn a popularity distribution of requests. However, a majority of work on analytical performance analysis focuses on hit probability after an…
We study a stochastic budget-allocation problem over $K$ tasks. At each round $t$, the learner chooses an allocation $X_t \in \Delta_K$. Task $k$ succeeds with probability $F_k(X_{t,k})$, where $F_1,\dots,F_K$ are nondecreasing…
Many prediction domains, such as ad placement, recommendation, trajectory prediction, and document summarization, require predicting a set or list of options. Such lists are often evaluated using submodular reward functions that measure…
We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of $N$ agents over a sequence of $T$ rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round,…
We present a new anytime algorithm that achieves near-optimal regret for any instance of finite stochastic partial monitoring. In particular, the new algorithm achieves the minimax regret, within logarithmic factors, for both "easy" and…
First-price auctions are one of the most popular mechanisms for selling goods and services, with applications ranging from display advertising to timber sales. Unlike their close cousin, the second-price auction, first-price auctions do not…
This paper considers a variant of the online paging problem, where the online algorithm has access to multiple predictors, each producing a sequence of predictions for the page arrival times. The predictors may have occasional prediction…
This paper investigates the impact of pre-existing offline data on online learning, in the context of dynamic pricing. We study a single-product dynamic pricing problem over a selling horizon of $T$ periods. The demand in each period is…
Designing truthful, revenue maximizing auctions is a core problem of auction design. Multi-item settings have long been elusive. Recent work (arXiv:1706.03459) introduces effective deep learning techniques to find such auctions for the…
Recent work has demonstrated that problems-- particularly imitation learning and structured prediction-- where a learner's predictions influence the input-distribution it is tested on can be naturally addressed by an interactive approach…
Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders' valuation distributions are known to the auctioneer, such as in the celebrated, revenue-optimal Myerson auction. However, this theory does not describe how the auctioneer comes to possess…
Representation learning is a powerful tool that enables learning over large multitudes of agents or domains by enforcing that all agents operate on a shared set of learned features. However, many robotics or controls applications that would…
How can non-communicating agents learn to share congested resources efficiently? This is a challenging task when the agents can access the same resource simultaneously (in contrast to multi-agent multi-armed bandit problems) and the…