Related papers: No-Regret Learning in Partially-Informed Auctions
We consider a dynamic pricing problem for repeated contextual second-price auctions with multiple strategic buyers who aim to maximize their long-term time discounted utility. The seller has limited information on buyers' overall demand…
We study online fair allocation of $T$ sequentially arriving items among $n$ agents with heterogeneous preferences, with the objective of maximizing generalized-mean welfare, defined as the $p$-mean of agents' time-averaged utilities, with…
In this paper, we study behavior of bidders in an experimental launch of a new advertising auction platform by Zillow, as Zillow switched from negotiated contracts to using auctions in several geographically isolated markets. A unique…
We consider the problem of online learning in Linear Quadratic Control systems whose state transition and state-action transition matrices $A$ and $B$ may be initially unknown. We devise an online learning algorithm and provide guarantees…
For each of $T$ time steps, $m$ experts report probability distributions over $n$ outcomes; we wish to learn to aggregate these forecasts in a way that attains a no-regret guarantee. We focus on the fundamental and practical aggregation…
We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has $n \ge 2$ players who simultaneously choose prices from the set $\{1/k, 2/k, \ldots, 1\}$, where $k\in\mathbb{N}$. The player who sets the…
We study the problem of planning under model uncertainty in an online meta-reinforcement learning (RL) setting where an agent is presented with a sequence of related tasks with limited interactions per task. The agent can use its experience…
We consider online convex optimization with a zero-order oracle feedback. In particular, the decision maker does not know the explicit representation of the time-varying cost functions, or their gradients. At each time step, she observes…
We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred to as the minority group. Specifically, the seller requires…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
Solving Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) is hard. Learning optimal controllers for POMDPs when the model is unknown is harder. Online learning of optimal controllers for unknown POMDPs, which requires efficient…
In this paper, we study a variant of the framework of online learning using expert advice with limited/bandit feedback. We consider each expert as a learning entity, seeking to more accurately reflecting certain real-world applications. In…
Multitask learning is a powerful framework that enables one to simultaneously learn multiple related tasks by sharing information between them. Quantifying uncertainty in the estimated tasks is of pivotal importance for many downstream…
We investigate brokerage between traders from an online learning perspective. At any round $t$, two traders arrive with their private valuations, and the broker proposes a trading price. Unlike other bilateral trade problems already studied…
We address the problem of maximizing Gain from Trade (GFT) in repeated buyer-seller exchanges subject to global budget balance constraints. While this problem is well-understood in purely adversarial and stochastic settings, these…
We consider the problem of bidding in online advertising, where an advertiser aims to maximize value while adhering to budget and Return-on-Spend (RoS) constraints. Unlike prior work that assumes knowledge of the value generated by winning…
This paper studies the optimal refund mechanism when an uninformed buyer can privately acquire information about his valuation of a product over time. We consider a class of refund mechanisms based on stochastic return policies: if the…
We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is approximately optimal in multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of valuations including unit-demand, additive, constrained additive, XOS, and subadditive. We…
We study reinforcement learning (RL) for decision processes with non-Markovian reward, in which high-level knowledge of the task in the form of reward machines is available to the learner. We consider probabilistic reward machines with…
We study a game between autobidding algorithms that compete in an online advertising platform. Each autobidder is tasked with maximizing its advertiser's total value over multiple rounds of a repeated auction, subject to budget and…