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We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…
We consider large scale cost allocation problems and consensus seeking problems for multiple agents, in which agents are suggested to collaborate in a distributed algorithm to find a solution. If agents are strategic to minimize their own…
We study a fair division problem in (multi)graphs where $n$ agents (vertices) are pairwise connected by items (edges), and each agent is only interested in its incident items. We consider how to allocate items to incident agents in an…
The study of mechanisms for multi-sided markets has received an increasingly growing attention from the research community, and is motivated by the numerous examples of such markets on the web and in electronic commerce. Many of these…
We study the problem of computing a Maximal Independent Set (MIS) in distributed networks where each node is a rational agent whose payoff depends on whether it joins the MIS. Classical distributed algorithms assume that nodes follow the…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this problem from the perspective of a broker, in a regret…
Constrained maximization of submodular functions poses a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, a number of agents need to maximize multiple submodular objectives over the same ground set. We study such…
The realization that selfish interests need to be accounted for in the design of algorithms has produced many contributions in computer science under the umbrella of algorithmic mechanism design. Novel algorithmic properties and paradigms…
We study data exchange among strategic agents without monetary transfers, motivated by domains such as research consortia and healthcare collaborations where payments are infeasible or restricted. The central challenge is to reap the…
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…
We consider trading indivisible and easily transferable \emph{durable goods}, which are goods that an agent can receive, use, and trade again for a different good. This is often the case with books that can be read and later exchanged for…
We study the design of optimal allocation mechanisms in an environment where agents and goods arrive stochastically. Agents have private types that determine the principal payoff. Either agents or goods can be held in a queue at a flow cost…
Suppose you run a home exam, where students should report their own scores but can cheat freely. You can, if needed, call a limited number of students to class and verify their actual performance against their reported score. We consider…
We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may…
The Probabilistic Serial mechanism is well-known for its desirable fairness and efficiency properties. It is one of the most prominent protocols for the random assignment problem. However, Probabilistic Serial is not incentive-compatible,…
Is transparency always beneficial in complex systems such as traffic networks and stock markets? How is transparency defined in multi-agent systems, and what is its optimal degree at which social welfare is highest? We take an agent-based…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
The use of algorithmic decision making systems in domains which impact the financial, social, and political well-being of people has created a demand for these decision making systems to be "fair" under some accepted notion of equity. This…