Related papers: PolicyCleanse: Backdoor Detection and Mitigation i…

Recent studies have shown that cooperative multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (c-MADRL) is under the threat of backdoor attacks. Once a backdoor trigger is observed, it will perform malicious actions leading to failures or malicious…

Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents are susceptible to adversarial noise in their observations that can mislead their policies and decrease their performance. However, an adversary may be interested not only in decreasing the reward,…

Most existing methods to detect backdoored machine learning (ML) models take one of the two approaches: trigger inversion (aka. reverse engineer) and weight analysis (aka. model diagnosis). In particular, the gradient-based trigger…

While reinforcement learning (RL) has achieved notable success in various domains, training effective policies for complex tasks remains challenging. Agents often converge to local optima and fail to maximize long-term rewards. Existing…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents can leverage tools such as Google Search to complete complex tasks. However, this tool usage introduces the risk of indirect prompt injections, where malicious instructions hidden in tool outputs can…

Static feature exclusion strategies often fail to prevent bias when hidden dependencies influence the model predictions. To address this issue, we explore a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that integrates bias mitigation and automated…

In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) related technology has expanded knowledge in the area, bringing to light new problems and challenges that require solutions. Furthermore, because the technology allows processes usually carried…

Federated learning (FL) systems allow decentralized data-owning clients to jointly train a global model through uploading their locally trained updates to a centralized server. The property of decentralization enables adversaries to craft…

Backdoor attacks inject poisoning samples during training, with the goal of forcing a machine learning model to output an attacker-chosen class when presented a specific trigger at test time. Although backdoor attacks have been demonstrated…

Reinforcement learning (RL) enables agents to learn optimal behaviors through interaction with their environment and has been increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, including autonomous driving. Despite its promise, RL is…

Backdoor attacks, in which a model behaves maliciously when given an attacker-specified trigger, pose a major security risk for practitioners who depend on publicly released language models. As a countermeasure, backdoor detection methods…

Backdoor attacks can cause reinforcement learning (RL) policies to behave normally under clean inputs while executing malicious behaviors when triggers are present. Existing RL backdoor attacks are primarily studied in simulation and often…

The growing dependence on machine learning in real-world applications emphasizes the importance of understanding and ensuring its safety. Backdoor attacks pose a significant security risk due to their stealthy nature and potentially serious…

Backdoor attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) have previously employed intense attack strategies to ensure attack success. However, these methods suffer from high attack costs and increased detectability. In this work, we propose a novel…

Time Series Classification (TSC) is highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, posing significant security threats. Existing methods primarily focus on data poisoning during the training phase, designing sophisticated triggers to improve…

Recent studies have shown that cooperative multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (c-MADRL) is under the threat of backdoor attacks. Once a backdoor trigger is observed, it will perform abnormal actions leading to failures or malicious…

Reinforcement learning agents learn by encouraging behaviours which maximize their total reward, usually provided by the environment. In many environments, however, the reward is provided after a series of actions rather than each single…

Trojan backdoor is a poisoning attack against Neural Network (NN) classifiers in which adversaries try to exploit the (highly desirable) model reuse property to implant Trojans into model parameters for backdoor breaches through a poisoned…

Deep learning models are vulnerable to various adversarial manipulations of their training data, parameters, and input sample. In particular, an adversary can modify the training data and model parameters to embed backdoors into the model,…

In recent years, the neural network backdoor hidden in the parameters of the federated learning model has been proved to have great security risks. Considering the characteristics of trigger generation, data poisoning and model training in…