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This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main…
While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the properties that optimal solutions need to have, and devised a…
Max-min bilinear optimization models, where one agent maximizes and an adversary minimizes a common bilinear objective, serve as canonical saddle-point formulations in optimization theory. They capture, among others, two-player zero-sum…
With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…
We derive multiparty games that, if the winning chance exceeds a certain limit, prove the incompatibility of the parties' causal relations with any partial order. This, in turn, means that the parties exert a back-action on the causal…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
Parity games are simple infinite games played on finite graphs with a winning condition that is expressive enough to capture nested least and greatest fixpoints. Through their tight relationship to the modal mu-calculus, they are used in…
In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the…
Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…
We consider infinite duration alternating move games. These games were previously studied by Roth, Balcan, Kalai and Mansour. They presented an FPTAS for computing an approximated equilibrium, and conjectured that there is a polynomial…
We introduce new theoretical insights into two-population asymmetric games allowing for an elegant symmetric decomposition into two single population symmetric games. Specifically, we show how an asymmetric bimatrix game (A,B) can be…
Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in $n$-player games, which builds the foundation for modern multi-agent learning algorithms. Although FP has provable…
This paper provides formulae and algorithms to compute the projection onto the core of a preimputation outside it. The core of a game is described using an exponential number of linear constraints, and we cannot know beforehand which are…
A class of discrete Bidding Combinatorial Games that generalize alternating normal play was introduced by Kant, Larsson, Rai, and Upasany (2022). The major questions concerning optimal outcomes were resolved. By generalizing standard game…
We study the underlying mathematical properties of various partial order models of concurrency based on transition systems, Petri nets, and event structures, and show that the concurrent behaviour of these systems can be captured in a…
Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to…
Recent successes of game-theoretic formulations in ML have caused a resurgence of research interest in differentiable games. Overwhelmingly, that research focuses on methods and upper bounds on their speed of convergence. In this work, we…
In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be divided among the agents in some reasonable manner. Cooperative…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
The equivalence between von Neumann's Minimax Theorem for zero-sum games and the LP Duality Theorem connects cornerstone problems of the two fields of game theory and optimization, respectively, and has been the subject of intense scrutiny…